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This dissertation consists of three papers on the interrelatedness of beliefs about 
family behavior, beliefs about societal development, and variation in family behaviors in 
a rapidly changing social context.  The first two essays address the beliefs of ordinary 
people concerning the relationship between family change and societal modernization. 
The last essay examines the ways in which individual, parental, and local community 
beliefs about spouse choice influence later spouse choice participation. 
My first two essays incorporate two prominent theories of social life—the 
modernization theory and W.I. Thomas’ theorem that people’s perceptions have real 
consequences—into an examination of the belief systems of people living in Nepal’s 
Chitwan Valley. In the first essay I document the extent to which survey respondents 
expect certain family types (late marriage, polygamy, small families) to be in certain 
types of societies (developed, poor, educated), and the extent to which they believe 
family change and societal change are causally connected. Survey results from this rural 
population in Nepal suggest that the majority of people strongly believe that behaviors 
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related to fertility, marriage, and gender equality are causally related to societal 
development. Respondents provide similar answers whether a society changes via 
education, wealth, or development.  
The second essay extends previous work by examining subgroup variation in 
belief in developmental models. Results based on the Nepal survey data demonstrate that 
the most disadvantaged and geographically isolated groups are the most likely to reject 
aspects of the developmental model. Respondents with higher levels of education and 
mass media consumption are more supportive of developmental models. 
In the third essay I create a theoretical framework to explain how the individual, 
family and local community interrelate to determine spouse choice behavior. This 
framework pays particular attention to the role of education as an allocator of social 
status and influence. Analyses on a sample from Nepal show that the attitudes of both 
young adults and their fathers influence participation in spouse choice, and that young 
adults with higher levels of education are significantly more likely to get the level of 








This dissertation consists of three essays that investigate the interactions among people’s 
beliefs, experiences, and behaviors in relation to family life. It provides additional 
evidence on how beliefs influence behavior, and suggests that new hypotheses are needed 
to reinterpret past theories of behavior.  
The first two essays share a similar focus by addressing people’s beliefs in models 
of modernization for family and society.  Theories of modernization or development have 
existed for centuries as social scientists have tried to explain the causes and effects of 
social change. These theories grew in number, complexity, and popularity beginning in 
the 18th century and provided powerful models for the world’s current and projected 
configurations. More important, however, they supplied a framework suggesting how 
certain social changes might be triggered by modifying individual behavior.  While 
evidence demonstrates that these models of social and family change have been used by 
the ruling elite to justify policies and programs, much less is understood about how 
everyday people view them. W.I. Thomas’ broad theorem—that actions are affected by 
subjective perceptions of situations—suggests that examining individuals’ views on these 
developmental theories may shed light on patterns of fertility and union formation 
behavior observed around the world. Thus, understanding the causal relationships people 
believe to be true may predict their attitudes, expectations and behavior.  
1 
 
My second and third chapters explore how people’s perceptions influence their 
actions by documenting the extent to which citizens of Nepal, a country in the midst of 
dramatic social change, accept ideas of modernization and social development. Several 
conditions make Nepal an exceptional site for the study of knowledge and beliefs 
concerning developmental models. First, Nepal’s historic isolation and the extreme 
exploitation of its population by the ruling elite, combined with the recent expansion of 
schools, health services, markets, bus services, cooperatives, and employment centers, 
have resulted in dramatic social change over recent decades. Second, established family 
behaviors in Nepal—behaviors addressed in developmental models—are undergoing 
rapid transformations. Third, new survey data are available from Nepal with measures of 
respondents’ beliefs in the causal relationships between (a) multiple family characteristics 
and (b) societal change along multiple causal pathways. Having these data, in this 
location, at this time provides a particularly powerful laboratory for this research. 
 Chapter 2 addresses two important questions. First, to what extent are these 
developmental models endorsed by the Nepali people? Second, how do the people 
conceptualize different aspects of the developmental models?  The multidimensional 
aspects of the data allow the use of both latent class analysis models to characterize 
respondents based on their belief in the different models of modernization, and a 
modified multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) analysis to test the extent to which 
respondents found correspondence among (a) family behaviors (e.g., late marriage, 
contraceptive use), (b) attributes of development (e.g., wealth and education), and (c) 
models of social change 
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 My third chapter extends this work by examining subpopulation variation in the 
belief in different developmental models. Under the assumption that dramatic social 
change generates important group differences related to this belief, I outline two 
noncompeting hypotheses for Nepal. The first hypothesis assumes that belief in the 
developmental models is a function of having knowledge of or exposure to them. Simply 
put, people will not support what they do not know. Thus, I conjecture that greater 
exposure to nonfamily organizations that promote these models such as education, media 
and nonfamily work, is linked with more approval of developmental models.  The second 
hypothesis assumes that belief in the developmental models is also a function of having 
the means to accomplish the goals and expectations encompassed in the models. People 
without these means will reject the models. That is, social exclusion leads to 
nonconformity. Therefore, I posit that social and geographic isolation are associated with 
less belief in developmental models that claim a causal connection between family 
change and societal change.  
 The fourth chapter transitions to a parallel topic within the beliefs and behavior 
research: autonomy. Foundational social scholars like Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Comte 
and many others examined how individuals and other entities such as the family, church, 
and community, express and enforce their will. Autonomy in family formation behavior 
is often determined by the relative strengths of the individual, the family, and the 
community wills. In Nepal, I assume that individual autonomy in spousal choice is 
largely a function of the strength of the family’s and community’s beliefs in the 





 Chapter 4 examines ideational influences on arranged marriage, incorporating 
individual-, family-, and neighborhood-level beliefs and related mechanisms that 
influence the young adult’s marriage behavior, and specifically assesses the role of 
education in spouse selection autonomy. I investigate these issues using survey data 
collected at the individual, family, and neighborhood levels in Nepal’s Chitwan Valley 
from 1996 to 2007, and by generating multilevel ordinal logistic regression and 
multilevel competing risk hazard models.  
CHAPTER 2
 






This paper outlines the combination of two prominent theories of social 
life: 1) modernization theory and 2) W.I. Thomas’ theorem that people’s 
perceptions have real consequences. It then documents the extent to which 
the complex idea of modernization and development has cemented itself in 
the minds of ordinary people as a model of how the world works. I employ 
latent class analysis and multi-trait multi-method measurement models and 
use 2003 survey data from Nepal to examine these issues. I document the 
extent to which people expect certain family types (late marriage, 
polygamy, small families) to be in certain society types (developed, poor, 
educated), and the extent to which people believe family change and 
societal change are causally connected. I also examine the respondents’ 
conceptual relationships of development. Results suggest that the majority 
of people strongly believe that development and family change are 
causally related. Fertility, marriage and gender equality are understood by 
respondents as a package of family behaviors causally related to 
development. Respondents provide similar answers whether a society 
changes via education, wealth or development. Finally, respondents 
appear to distinguish between models of family change causing societal 





Theories of modernization or development have existed for centuries, evidence of 
social scientists’ attempts to explain  the causes and effects of social change. Unilinear 
modernization and development theories grew in number, complexity and popularity 
beginning in the 18th century and became mainstays of paradigms in sociology, 
economics, demography, and anthropology until the early 20th century (Eisenstadt 1964; 
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Gusfield 1967; Thornton 2005). These theories, which often substituted geographically 
varying data for historically varying data, attempted to causally connect various aspects 
of life, from religion and family to education, labor, and economics (Moaddel 1994; 
Crenshaw 1995; Smits, Ultee and Lammers 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000; York, Rosa, 
Dietz 2003). They provided powerful explanations for the world’s current and projected 
configurations (Geertz 1973). More important, however, they supplied a framework 
suggesting how certain social changes might be triggered by modifying individual 
behavior. In other words, modernization theories provided possible ways for people to 
change the social world around them (Thornton 2005).  
Of particular interest for scholars of these theories has been the existence of a 
causal connection between modern family life and modern societies (Malthus 1986; 
Thornton 2005). Some have suggested that the modernization of families (i.e., older ages 
at marriage, greater use of contraceptives, smaller numbers of children) causes societies 
become more modern (e.g., wealthier, more educated). Others have explored and 
theorized the reverse causal relationship. This crucial difference, and less profound 
differences as well, have led to a wide range of modernization theories related to the 
family (Boas 1940; Crenshaw 1995; Eisenstadt 1964; Gusfield 1967; Inglehart and Baker 
2000; Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 1980; Portes 1976; Smits, Ultee and 
Lammers 2000; Thornton 2001, 2005; York, Rosa, Dietz 2003).  
Despite this extensive research and theorizing, and despite evidence that ruling 
elites have used developmental models to justify policies and programs (Harris 1968; 
Latham 2000; Mandelbaum 1971; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 1969, 1980; Sanderson 
1990; Thornton 2001, 2005), much less is understood about how ordinary people 
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understand these models of social and family change (Ahearn 2004; Amin 1989; Blaut 
1993; Caldwell et al. 1988; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Pigg 1992; Wang 1999). 
W.I. Thomas’ theorem—that people’s perceptions have real consequences 
(Thomas and Thomas 1928)—suggests that if ordinary people believe the theory that 
modern societies produce modern families – or the reverse – they may be directly 
influenced by changes in either of these domains. Thus, belief in causal relationships 
between individuals and societies may predict individual behavior in much the same way 
that values predict behavior (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Caldwell 1982, 2001; 
Casterline 2001; Freedman 1979, 1987; Goode 1970; Lesthaeghe 1980, 1983; Lesthaeghe 
and Wilson 1986; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Pritchett 1994; Rogers 2003; 
Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007; van de Kaa 1987, 1996).  
As is often the case when addressing emerging theories, existing data and 
methods must be modified or created to examine new hypotheses. In this case, new and 
highly salient data are available, collected from a sample in Nepal using a survey 
instrument expressly intended to measure people’s beliefs in the causal relationships 
between family and societal change. This survey examined many aspects of family and 
social life, and probed respondents’ views on numerous potential causal interconnections 
between these aspects. And, because the respondents reside in a remote rural setting 
experiencing tremendous societal and family changes, the study context is also ideal.  
BACKGROUND and THEORY 
Perceptions, Values and Actions 
During the early 20th century, as scholars became less enamored with grand 
theories of social change, social scientists began to turn from studying the direct effects 
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of social structures on individuals to examining how individuals perceived their 
circumstances and how those perceptions modified their values and behaviors (Collins 
and Makowsky 1998). A foundational statement for this work was given by W.I. Thomas 
when he wrote: “It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct—if men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 
1928:572). The key point of the Thomas Theorem1 is that an individual’s beliefs or 
perceptions about a circumstance—regardless of their basis in actuality—will have an 
effect on the individual’s related actions. Further, an individual’s interpretation of a 
situation may gain meaning and be reinforced as a result of the actions associated with it, 
beyond any objective significance this interpretation may have. 
Merton (1968) expands on this theorem by suggesting that an individual’s 
interpretations of a situation may increase the likelihood of future outcomes associated 
with that belief.  This “self-fulfilling prophecy” then reinforces the strength of the 
connection between the interpretation and the related outcome. A classic example is a 
bank run, where individuals’ perceptions about a bank’s insolvency – regardless of their 
accuracy – produce behavior (bank withdrawals) that increases the likelihood of 
outcomes related to the belief (bank insolvency). Clearly, the interpretation or 
“prediction” need not be correct to have an effect in the predicted direction. But given the 
reinforcement of the causal connection in a self-fulfilling prophesy between the 
interpretation (bank is going to fail) and the outcome (bank insolvency), it becomes 
difficult to sort out the effects of objective factors that might have influenced the outcome 
from the effects of situational interpretations.   
                                                            
1 Although the Thomas Theorem is initially presented in a jointly authored work, as Merton (1995) shows, 
this concept, as it is defined here, is the notion of W.I. Thomas alone.  
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The theories of Thomas (1928) and Merton (1968) fit nicely with Geertz’s 
conjecture that beliefs and ideas provide models for both understanding reality and 
dealing with the world (Geertz 1973; also see Fricke 1997, and D’Andrade 1984). 
Ideational frameworks help to describe and explain the world by giving meaning to 
certain behaviors and institutions and by identifying appropriate and productive methods 
for achieving desired goals.  Substantial evidence indicates that ideational frameworks 
have influenced people’s family behaviors in particular. For example, Goode (1970) 
identifies an increasing social preference for the conjugal family over the extended family 
as influential on changes in family structures.  Lesthaeghe and his colleagues view 
increasing emphases on egalitarianism and individualism as important social forces for 
worldwide family changes (Lesthaeghe 1980, 1983; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986; 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2008; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987). 
Pritchett (1994) posits that declining family size preferences played a significant role in 
the decline in fertility around the world. Several scholars have explored the effects of 
Western ideals on family behavior around the world—notably, movement toward smaller 
families, older ages at marriage, more autonomy in spousal choice and marriage timing, 
and greater gender egalitarianism (Caldwell 1982; Freedman 1979, 1987; van de Kaa 
2001; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Easterlin 1980; Thornton and Lin 1994; 
Bista 1994). 
Although the studies mentioned above have provided powerful evidence that 
ideational frameworks are important, and that they are dynamic across time and 
geography, the studies do not explore why or how some ideas displace others, causing 
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changes in individuals’ perceptions, behavior, and outcomes. That is, what causes 
individuals to adopt  new ideas (typically Western and or “modern”) over former 
(“traditional”) models, values, and perceptions—and concomitantly change their behavior 
to conform more closely to these new ideologies? Understanding people’s perceptions of 
situations is fundamental to understanding their behavior.  
Developmental Idealism 
In a recent stream of theorizing, Thornton (2001, 2005) argues that a package of 
ideas he calls developmental idealism (DI) was disseminated widely around the world 
where it has been a major force for family and demographic change.  The elements of 
developmental idealism can be defined broadly to include most of the ideational factors 
posited in the literature as being important influences on family and demographic 
behavior.  DI directly incorporates into its elements the Western and modern values and 
beliefs that are used either directly or indirectly in most of the ideational literature 
explaining family and demographic change. It also adds something that is missing from 
the literature—a reason why the non-Western world would care about, and be influenced 
by, Western and/or modern ideas. That is, it supplies a reason for why people would 
redefine their situations and therefore act in accordance with new values and predictions. 
It also brings into the picture such ideational forces as the desire for a higher standard of 
living, desires for freedom and equality, an emphasis on individual agency rather than 
fatalism, individualism, skepticism about authority and institutions, the empowerment of 
women and the younger generation, and desires for small families, mature marriage, and 
acceptance of fertility control.   
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Theories of modernization or development dominated much of Western thinking 
from the Enlightenment of the 1600s and 1700s to the present (Thornton 2005).  Initially, 
the theories asserted that all societies progress or evolve through the same natural, 
universal, and necessary stages of development (Inglehart 2001). The speed of 
advancement was believed to vary so that at any one point in time societies at different 
developmental levels could be observed. Thus, societal evolution, development or 
modernization was unilinear. Scholars applying these theories believed that the most 
advanced societies were in northwest Europe and among the northwest European 
Diaspora, while other societies occupied less advanced positions of development 
(Thornton 2001, 2005; Inglehart 2001). Many of these scholars used the particularly 
dubious method of substituting geographic variation for historical variation by assuming 
that in their past, developed nations had been like their less developed contemporaries, 
and that at some point in the future the less modern nations would become like their 
modern neighbors (for detailed discussions, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Thornton 2005).   
Applying the modernization theories to cross-sectional data on family and 
economic systems, these scholars postulated that geographic family and societal 
differences were due to modernization (Thornton 2001, 2005). That is, despite the large 
variation of family types, both within and without Northwest Europe, scholars surmised 
that the family formation patterns of Northwest Europe (less family solidarity, later 
marriage, less parental authority, greater status of women, etc) were causally connected 
to higher levels of industry, urbanization, education, consumption, geographic mobility, 
secularism, democracy, religious pluralism, and other societal characteristics. Although 
there was some debate about the direction of the causal arrows between cultural/family 
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change and economic change, there was no doubt as to the correlation (Inglehart 2001). 
In fact, they argued that sometime before they wrote in the 1700s and 1800s, there had 
been a great family transition that had changed European families from being like the 
world outside of northwest Europe which they labeled as traditional to being like the 
families of northwest Europe that they labeled as developed or modern (Thornton 2001, 
2005).   
These theories saturated social science literature from the 1700s through the 
middle 1900s, but in the second half of the 1900s, studies using Northwest European 
historical records exposed that there was no great family transition from family types 
outside of Northwest Europe to the family types in Northwest Europe (Laslett 1983; 
Macfarlane 1978; Hajnal 1965; Wrigley and Schofield 1981).  This new research 
revealed that the family systems of northwest Europe observed in the 1700s and 1800s 
had been in place for centuries, thus causing some scholars to doubt the idea that societies 
progressed over time from the traditional family systems outside of northwest Europe to 
the modern family systems of northwest Europe.  It also cast doubt on the idea that 
modern family systems were the products of modern socioeconomic systems (Boas 1940; 
Eisenstadt 1964; Gusfield 1967; Portes 1976; Thornton 2005). These theories, were at 
best seen as too restrictive—leading to multilinear models (Steward 1955; van Nort and 
Karon 1955)—and vague (Gusfield 1967; Mills 1959; van Nort and Karon 1955), and at 
worst, they were ethnocentric historical fallacies (Boas 1940). Nevertheless, many social 
theories still employed today maintain a strong developmental component (Crenshaw 




Thornton (2001, 2005) argues that the development theories used by past social 
scholars created a set of propositions that have been a force for family change during the 
last two centuries. These models and their conclusions provided new rubrics for judging 
society, family life, and the rights of human beings. They predicted a direction for future 
family and social change, and described mechanisms people should employ to facilitate 
social, economic, and familial changes. More specifically, DI’s four interrelated 
propositions state that: 1) a modern society that is industrialized, urbanized, highly 
educated, and with high levels of technology is good and to be sought after; 2) modern 
families, defined as having high levels of individualism, high status of women, mature 
marriage, marriage arranged by the couple, high youth-autonomy, small households, and 
controlled and low fertility are preferred family types; 3) modern society and modern 
family are causally connected, with a modern society being a cause and effect of a 
modern family system; and 4) individuals have the right to be free and equal. Thornton 
(2001, 2005) argues that DI was disseminated widely around the world—through a 
myriad of mechanisms such as scholarly publications, Christianity, political movements, 
US foreign policy programs, and the United Nations —and has been an exceptionally 
powerful force for family change during the 1800s and 1900s. He argues that it has been 
a particularly important force in many family changes during this period, including 
declines in childbearing and increases in age at marriage, the autonomy of young people, 
egalitarianism, divorce, independent living, sexual activity and cohabitation outside 
marriage, and growing emphasis on individual rights. 
Although all four propositions of the theory are important, this paper argues that 
the third proposition, that family change and societal change are causally related is a 
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particularly critical element. Recall that in Thomas’ Theorem (1928) when people define 
a situation—or in this case a model of change—as real, then they will act as though that 
model is real. Thus, even though, as more recent historical research has shown, the 
powerful models of development are not accurate, people will act as though they are. If 
people expect family change, from historical family types to “modern” family types (later 
marriage, fewer children, more egalitarian gender roles, less parental control, etc) to 
increase development, then they will be motivated to change their families to be more 
“modern.” Similarly if people believe modernization makes families more developed, 
they will change their families to be in line with their more developed society. 
Merton’s (1968) self fulfilling prophecy is also applicable in this situation. For 
example, if a group of people are taught, and believe, that family change and 
development are causally related, some families may change their behavior (or the 
younger generation will change their behavior from the previous generation) because are 
anticipating the social transforms. These changes, over time, may not ever lead to 
substantial economic gains, but because there has been substantial family change, people 
may see the change to a more modern family as evidence that the developmental model 
was correct. This would therefore promote additional changes as more people are 
persuaded to believe the model is correct. In fact, some people may point to a lack of 
economic change and suggest that is a result of insufficient family change (i.e. traditional 
families hinder social and economic progress). 
Due to the universal nature of the DI model, people often assume evidence from 
one place can be used as evidence in another location. When introducing the 
developmental model, those teaching it had (and still have) substantial evidence to show 
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that some places were, in fact, more “developed”—which was certainly a powerful 
indicator that the model of development was true. Using the same methods as scholars 
before, people provide evidence that the family changes they experienced seemingly 
caused their development. Thus it is reasonable to assume that at some point the self-
fulfilled prophecy of one group leads to the self-fulfilling prophecy of another.  
Particularly powerful for this study, an important concept in Nepali culture is 
fatalism. Bista (1994) has argued that development has been slow because people tend 
not to take the action necessary to cause change2. In fact, however, I argue that the 
reliance on fate may be a powerful influence for change once the developmental model is 
accepted as real. That is, if, as the developmental model indicates, all aspects of 
development are inevitable, people will begin to change their behavior (i.e. use 
contraceptives, allow their children to choose their own spouses, marry later) because that 
is their inevitable fate. 
Before going on to discuss the evidence supporting DI, it is important to briefly 
integrate it into current theories of family and demographic change. Although many 
structural explanations appear to fall victim to the fallacy of the developmental paradigm, 
to suggest that only ideational factors are present would be incorrect (Caldwell 2001; van 
da Kaa 1996; and Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). For example, DI may encourage 
governments to invest more heavily in schools, health posts and fertility clinics. These 
additions to the social structure lead to physical changes that not only provide more 
contact with DI, but also real changes in health, time use, family activities, everyday 
concerns, costs and benefits of fertility, as well as evidence that the region is indeed 
                                                            
2 Although Bista (1994) makes a strong argument, events beginning in 1996 and leading to the Maoist 




“progressing” (Caldwell 1982; Cain 1977; Cain 1983; Preston 1978; Inglehart 1997; 
Lesthaeghe 1980; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). Certainly without some structural 
changes the ideas of DI would not be supported by personal experience, and might be 
discarded.  
DI is also consistent with many cultural explanations of family change. Freedman 
(1979, 1987), Caldwell (1982, 2001), and van da Kaa (1996) all suggest the importance 
of Western ideas on global family change. However, as suggested previously, none 
provide a motivation for trading historically held values for those of the West. DI fills 
this gap by providing a model for a better future by adopting these primarily Western 
ideals. DI can also work within several other frameworks such as Greenhalgh’s political 
economy approach (1990, 1995) as well as Bongaarts and Watkins’ social interaction 
theory (1996) by providing the message (as well as the goal) in social interactions. 
Consequently, DI is also consistent with similar work on diffusion such as social 
transmission, learning, influence and socialization (Casterline 2001; Rogers 2003; 
Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). In fact, the simultaneity of the fertility decline across the 
globe is most easily described by a large influx of this powerful ideology across the globe 
at around the same time (Caldwell 2001). 
DI integrates most of the ideational factors contained in the research literature 
concerning ideational forces on family behavior and change. DI can add enormously to 
endemic material aspirations by increasing the number of things to be attained, by 
declaring more things attainable, and by giving a western model for achieving those 
things. So, while material aspirations can and do exist outside of DI, they are enhanced 
and channeled in specific ways by the developmental model. The ideas of freedom and 
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equality did not originate with the developmental thinking of the 1600s and 1700s, but 
existed long before that and can exist independent of DI. However, the growing strength 
of the ideas of development from the 1700s onward provided further support for the 
principles of freedom and equality, and helped fuel the adoption of these principles in 
many places around the world.  It also brings into the picture such ideational forces as the 
quest for the western and/or modern, the desire for a higher standard of living, an 
emphasis on individual agency, expressive individualism, skepticism about authority and 
institutions, the empowerment of women and the younger generation, and desires for 
small families, mature marriage, and fertility control. 
Existing Evidence about the Dissemination of Developmental Models 
Several studies have shown that developmental models have dominated social 
science thinking for most of the past quarter millennium (Harris 1968; Mandelbaum 
1971; Nisbet 1969; Sanderson 1990; Thornton 2001, 2005). It is only in the last few 
decades that the developmental or modernization paradigm has been strongly 
challenged—and even discredited—and many of the conclusions of the generations of 
scholars shown to be myths. Thus, for hundreds of years these models were circulated 
without extensive challenge. It has also been documented that European travelers, 
colonial administrators, leaders of the feminist movement, and family planning advocates 
have relied heavily on developmental arguments (Thornton 2001, 2005). In addition, the 
role of developmental models has been important in the documents of the United Nations, 
numerous governments, including those of China and the United States, and international 
nongovernmental organizations (Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 1980; UNDP 
2001, 2002; United Nations 1948, 1962, 1979).   
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There are also limited data from ordinary people consistent with the idea that 
developmental thinking is both widespread and influential. Observers in Africa, India, 
China, Nepal, and New Guinea have reported examples of ordinary people using a 
developmental or hierarchical framework in evaluating various attributes and behavior 
(Ahearn 2004; Amin 1989; Blaut 1993; Caldwell et al. 1988; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Pigg 
1992; Wang 1999). For example, Pigg (1992) and Ahearn (2004) use ethnographic data 
to show that in some rural areas of Nepal, people use developmental thinking to compare 
urban and rural life and to think about marriage and other aspects of family life. While 
these studies have documented that people associate some family types with some society 
types, primarily focusing on urban and rural differences within the country, they have not 
explored people’s understanding of the causal relationships between society type and 
family. As well, they have typically explored a limited range of society and family types.   
More recent work by Thornton and colleagues has explored this area in greater 
detail (Thornton 2001, 2005; Thornton, Ghimire and Mitchell 2005; de Jong, Ghimire, 
Thornton and Pierce 2006; Binstock and Thornton 2005; Thornton and Philipov 2009). 
For example, Thornton, Ghimire and Mitchell (2005) find strong evidence that a sample 
of people in Nepal understood the developmental paradigm well enough to provide 
development scores that correlated highly (both at the aggregate and individual levels) 
with the UN Human Development scores for a diverse list of countries. Using the same 
sample in Nepal, de Jong, Ghimire, Thornton and Pierce (2006), show that Nepalis value 
modern family characteristics such as later marriage, child choice marriages, fewer 
children and even an increased tolerance toward divorce. Nevertheless, this research does 
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not provide an examination of people’s beliefs in the causal relationships between 
societal and family change.  
RESEARCH AIMS 
A rudimentary hypothesis based on this previous work is that people believe in 
models of modernization that causally connect societal attributes and family 
characteristics. This paper is the first to conceptualize and measure individuals’ beliefs in 
developmental models—specifically the causal relationship between family change and 
development. An application of both Thomas’ and Merton’s theories suggest that 
measuring individual’s beliefs about these models is requisite to better understanding 
peoples’ later actions. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence 
concerning people’s beliefs in these models of social change. My analyses concentrate on 
answering two questions. First, to what extent are these models of social change 
endorsed? Second, what are the conceptual relationships between these models of 
change? To address these questions, this study examines data from a 2003 study of 
people in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal that was specifically designed to measure their 
beliefs concerning models of family and societal change. 
This paper provides two indicators of who endorses these developmental models. 
First, by estimating overall endorsement of the models using frequencies, we learn the 
scope of DI’s penetration into the beliefs of a sample of people in Nepal. Second, because 
of the multidimentional nature of the data, I use latent class analysis of individual’s 
survey responses to estimate overall belief in the modernization models, as well as how 
the different pieces of DI are understood and believed. As I discuss in greater detail 
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below, different parameterizations supply important confirmations and validations of the 
latent class findings. 
This paper also addresses the conceptualizations of social and family change. For 
example, scholars have long debated the causal direction of the relationship between 
family and societal change (Thornton 2001, 2005). Thus, one aim of this paper is to 
determine if people distinguish between models suggesting development causes family 
change, models that family change causes societal change, and models where the two are 
just associated. Similarly, there are also debates as to what types of social change are 
aspects of development. Judging by the UN Human Development score components, two 
of the most important are wealth and education (UNDP 2003). Therefore another aim is 
to examine the perceived relationships between different types of social change. Finally, 
another issue is what family behaviors are related to development. For example, the 
literature suggests that fertility, marriage, and gender equality are all related to 
development (UN 1962, 1979; UNDP 2003; Thornton 2005). My own experience in 
Nepal, as well as my collaboration with Nepal experts, suggests that these behaviors are 
portrayed in media and schools as a package of behaviors that both cause and are affected 
by development. Consequently, another element of this paper speaks to how respondents 
distinguish between different family behaviors within the development models. As a final 
point, it is important to note that although it is my purpose to examine the extent to which 
others endorse DI, this should not be taken as evidence that I endorse the propositions of 
DI myself. Rather, I recognize the motivational power behind these models, and hope to 
eventually evaluate the possible influence they may have on human behavior.  
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DATA and METHODS 
Setting 
There are several considerations that make Nepal an especially appropriate 
location for the study of knowledge and beliefs concerning developmental models. Nepal 
was kept in isolation from the rest of the world until the 1950s (Adhikari 1998). The 
historical isolation, extreme exploitation by the ruling elite, the Hinduization of the non-
Hindu population, and the rugged Himalayan topography with few roads and 
communication resources have had an enduring influence on many aspects of Nepali life. 
Nepal currently ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world. Over 85 percent of the 
population still lives in rural areas with no all-weather roads, poor public education, few 
health services and limited communication technology. More than half of the population 
is still illiterate. In addition, several attributes of the family that are labeled by DI as 
traditional have historically characterized Nepal and are still common. These include 
extended households, early age at marriage, arranged marriage, parental control over 
children, and low status of women.  
The data for this research were collected in Chitwan Valley, which lies in the 
south central part of Nepal. In 1955, the Nepalese government opened this valley for 
settlement; prior to this it was covered with dense tropical forest. Chitwan soon became a 
social melting pot, receiving migrants from all over the country. The valley has become 
connected to the rest of the country by all-weather roads, making it a business hub for the 
country. Furthermore, there has been a massive expansion of schools, health services, 
markets, bus services, cooperatives, and employment centers in Chitwan (Axinn & 
Yabiku, 2001). Previous work in Chitwan shows that there has been a sharp increase in 
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school enrollment, visits to health clinics, family planning, employment outside of the 
home, development programs, and exposure to different sources of mass media and new 
ideas in recent birth cohorts (Axinn & Barber, 2001; Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Barber et al. 
2001; Beutel and Axinn 2002; Ghimire et al., 2006). Despite this general increase, 
however, much of this research has also demonstrated that access to these institutions, 
programs, and information is still highly heterogeneous due to both spatial and cultural 
barriers. Thus, this setting is particularly helpful by affording access to a broad range of 
people whose different cultural settings and differential contact with the aforementioned 
institutions, programs, and information can produce a possibly wide range of beliefs in 
developmental models.  
Sample Design 
The survey was conducted in 2003, with 537 people aged 17 and above living in 
the Western Chitwan Valley. These people were chosen using the following strategy.  
First, based on the distance from the primary urban center within the Chitwan Valley, the 
study area was divided into five distinct strata.  Second, a sample of 2-4 neighborhoods, 
consisting of 4-25 households from each stratum, was selected.  Finally, once a 
neighborhood was selected, all the individuals age 17 and above residing in those 
neighborhoods were interviewed. This sampling procedure resulted in slightly more than 
100 individuals being selected from each of the five strata. These people were 
interviewed in face-to-face interviews in the Nepali language using paper and pencil 
format. Three respondents who could not be interviewed in Nepali were excluded from 





Although individuals’ ideas, values and attitudes have long been hypothesized to 
influence their preferences and behaviors (Caldwell 1982; Inglehart 1997; Lesthaeghe 
1980), studies of ideational influences on individual behavior still struggle with important 
theoretical and methodological challenges. On the theoretical side, conceptualizing 
complex concepts, such as modernity, individualism, and nucleation has been a major 
challenge. Often, theories of ideational influence take complex constructs from western 
thought and apply them to nonwestern cultural settings that may or may not have similar 
cultural constructs. And even when the constructs are similar across societies, there 
remains extensive variation in individuals’ understanding.   
To address this complexity researchers used the insights gained from 12 in-depth 
interviews and 10 focus groups (conducted by trained Nepali interviews), and combined 
them with their conceptual understanding of developmental models to construct 
individual questionnaire items. A key strategy guiding the construction of questions was 
to break the complex propositions of DI into their component parts using concepts and 
language that were understandable by ordinary Nepalis.  Thus, most questions were not 
about abstract concepts, but instead focused on family matters that were very familiar to 
Nepalis such as marriage, living arrangements, parent-child relations, childbearing, and 
contraception.  Similarly, parallel questions focused on socioeconomic structures used 
familiar concepts such as education and wealth. 
Models of Modernization 
In this paper I focus on 9 sections of questions investigating knowledge and belief 
in developmental models and their application in concrete situations. Together these  
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sections asked 60 questions to systematically document peoples’ beliefs in the correlation 
and causal relationship between family change and social change. Knowing that 
respondents may not all view development the same, researchers also took care to ask 
about three different aspects of modernization (education, getting richer, and 
development). As well, researchers asked about three different models of change or 
modernization (family type is correlated with society type, social change causes family 
change and family change causes societal changes).  Of the 60 questions, four family 
domains (marriage timing, gender equality, spouse choice and contraceptive use) were 
asked in all nine sections. In order to streamline the paper, I focus on these 4 family 
domains which cover a relatively broad range of topics including fertility, autonomy, 
equality, marriage and intergenerational relationships, thus supplying an analytic subset 
of (3x3x4) 36 questions.3 Appendix A provides the exact wording, distributions and 
coding of each of these measures. 
More specifically, three of the sections in the survey presented one of four family 
characteristics (e.g. marrying at older ages, spouse choice, etc) and then asked if this 
characteristic is more common in different places or types of societies. There were three 
location comparisons possible in the three sections:  1) rich versus poor places; 2) 
developed versus traditional places; and 3) educated versus uneducated places. The 
respondents could specify that a characteristic was more common in one location (e.g. a 
rich place) or in the other location (e.g. a poor place). Respondents could also volunteer 
that the family trait was “equally common in both” or that they “don’t know,” but only 
after a follow-up probe asking the respondent to give their best guess or estimate. 
                                                            
3 A previous version of this paper, Mitchell (2008), discusses the 13 family domains by using all 60 
questions. The results from that paper suggest that the 13 common family domains provide substantively 
similar results to those presented here. 
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Together, researchers intended these three sections to measure if survey respondents 
expected specific family types to be associated with different places, that is, did they see 
an association between family type and society type. Thus, this could be seen as a test of 
developmental thinking—without any specific causal model for family and societal 
changes.   
 Similarly, three other sections presented the same family characteristics as above 
and then asked if making the country more developed, richer, or more educated would 
make people marry earlier or later, have more or fewer children, etc. Also responses of 
“no change” or “don’t know” were accepted if the respondents voiced them after a follow 
up probe asking them to give their best guess or estimate. These three sections 
specifically measure if the survey respondents understand or believe that societal change 
(becoming richer, more developed or more educated) would cause family changes. This 
measure helps examine if respondents believe that family change is a result of 
development.   
 Finally, the last three sections reverse the causal relationship between family 
change and modernization. These sections ask if changing various family characteristics 
(people marrying later, having larger families, etc) would make the Nepal richer, a better 
place4, or more educated. As with the previous sets of sections, people were allowed to 
provide the options of “no change” and “don’t know” as a response after probing. These 
three sections of questions provide an estimate of the individual’s belief that specific 
family change leads to a more modern society. 
                                                            
4 Based on the in-depth interviews and focus groups the idea of a better place and developed place are very 
similar in Nepali.  
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To analyze the questions, they were coded so that 1 meant the answer was in line 
with developmental thinking and everything else—including answers of “don’t know,” 
“the same,” “no change,” and missing—was coded as 0 (see Appendix A for all the 
question-specific coding). It is important to note that there was typically only one to three 
percent of the sample that provided responses other than the two provided options. Also, 
only 1 person refused to provide an answer or gave uncodeable response and this only 
occurred on one of the 36 questions.  
RESULTS 
--Table 2.1 about here-- 
Table 2.1 reports the percent agreeing with the developmental idealism model. At 
the bottom of each column is the average percent agreeing with developmental idealism 
for the entire section of questions, and below that is the average for the three sections for 
in each causal direction. If we assume that respondents randomly guessed between the 
two main answers (e.g. More Common/Less Common, Richer/Poorer, etc), then 
percentages would center around 50%. Similarly, if everyone was in-line with DI, and 
there was no measurement error, the percentages would be close to 100%, and if peoples’ 
beliefs were contrary to DI, the percentages would be close to 0%.  
Family & Society Characteristic Association 
 This set of 12 questions contains three subsets, all of which are intended to reflect 
the respondent’s belief in the joint distribution of specific family characteristics and 
society characteristics. Respondents were asked to choose if certain family characteristics 
(see Appendix A) were more likely to be found in: a Rich or Poor country, a Traditional 
or Developed country, and an Uneducated or Educated country. Because DI states that 
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people marrying at older ages, women getting treated with more respect, young people 
choosing their own spouse, and married couples using contraception would be more 
common in wealthier, more educated and more developed countries, higher percentages 
indicates greater overall belief in DI. 
Although there is some variation, most people provide developmental idealistic 
responses that modern families and modern societies are correlated. The set of questions 
asking about wealth and family types shows an average of 75% agreement with the 
developmental model. A higher average agreement of 88% can be found in the four 
questions correlating education and family domains. Finally, the section asking about the 
correlation of development and family domain also has high support with 80%. All of the 
questions are significantly above the random guessing level of 50%, but none of them are 
within statistical significance of 100%.  
The overall percentage for the entire set of questions is relatively high, 81%, 
which is just more than midway between what we would expect if everyone believed in 
the developmental model (and had no measurement error) and if everyone was randomly 
selecting answers. Having all 12 items significantly higher than 50% suggests that, on 
average people tend to believe that a modern society is highly correlated with several 
family characteristics.  
Society Change Causes Family Change 
 The next set of questions measures the belief that a society’s development causes 
the societies families to modernize. That is, as a society becomes richer, or more 
educated, or more developed, people would be expected to marry at older ages, have 
smaller families, give women more respect, and choose their own spouse.  
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 Overall there is confirmation that people believe that development causes family 
change. With a high average agreement of 82% for all 12 questions, most respondents 
provide the modern answer. In particular, respondents report a high agreement with the 
idea that modernization or development leads to women getting treated with more 
respect.    
Family Change Causes Society Change 
 The third set of 12 questions reverses the causal direction of the set of questions 
just discussed by asking if families changed in specific ways would that make Nepal 
richer or poorer, a better or worse place, and more or less educated. Thus, a higher 
number means more agreement with the idea that people marrying at older ages, women 
getting treated with more respect, people choosing their own spouse, and married couples 
using contraception will make Nepal more modern.  
 Overall the responses to these questions support the conclusion that people 
believe that family change can cause societal-level change in wealth, education and 
development. Based on 12 questions, on average, respondents were 84% in agreement 
that family change is expected to make a change in Nepal’s development. All three 
columns had similar overall agreement levels, and each of the family types also appeared 
to have similar agreement levels, with the exception of spouse choice which was slightly 
lower than the other family types. Thus although  people generally believe that family 
change causes societal change, there is less agreement that letting young people choose 
their own spouse will cause societies to modernize. 
 Relating these results back to the theory motivating this paper, if people really do 
expect changing their families will make their country more developed, and they believe 
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that development is good, they would be expected to act on that belief. Note that this is 
true even if the model or causal relationship they believe to be true is false. Similarly, if 
people believe that development produces broad changes in family life, they may be more 
lenient to changes (or even encourage them). If those changes would not have occurred 
otherwise, then they have also just fulfilled their own prophecy. 
Response Groups 
 To assimilate and confirm these results, I conduct a latent class analysis (LCA) 
using the 36 binary indicators just discussed. LCA aids in the characterization of a 
multidimensional set of observed variables (McCutcheon 1987, 2002). That is, in lieu of 
assuming the 36 questions provide multiple dimensions of intensity of belief (i.e. 
believing that education causes family change, getting married later causes development, 
etc), we can use the questions to find typologies of responses, or response profiles. For 
example, two very obvious groups would be those who provide answers suggesting a 
belief in Developmental Idealism and those whose answers imply disbelief in DI. Several 
other groups may exist, such as: those who believe in one causal direction over another, 
believing some family types may be affected while other family characteristics remain 
unchanged, etc. By examining the classes of responses we can better understand the 
extent of the belief in the various aspects of DI. Thus, by combining multiple indicators 
in the LCA we can gain a better comprehension of how consistent respondents are in the 
beliefs of models of modernization. 
Number of Response Groups 
--Table 2.2 about here-- 
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 Maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters for each latent class model are 
estimated using iterative procedures, in this case the EM algorithm (Dayton 1998; 
Muthén  and Muthén 2006). To determine the number of classes (or groups) of different 
response patterns present in the data, Table 2.2 provides several indicators of model fit 
for models with 1 to 5 latent classes. Notice that for each additional class, 37 parameters 
are estimated (36 item parameters and one class parameter). Despite being maximum-
likelihood estimates, most research suggests that the often used model likelihood (i.e. 
standard likelihood ratio test of fit) is not a good indicator of overall model fit5 (Nylund, 
Asparouhov, Muthén 2007). The other measures of fit are the AIC, BIC and the Lo-
Mendell-Rubin (LMR). The LMR is a specialized likelihood ratio test of model fit that 
compares the estimated model (# of classes k) with a model of k-1 class. The reported p-
value represents a test of the hypothesis that a model with one less class fits the data as 
well as the current model (Lo, Mendell and Rubin 2001). Considering the large number 
of indicators and the possible complexity and inequality of the class sizes, determining 
the best fitting model requires information from all the measures of fit (Dayton 1998; Lo, 
Mendell and Rubin 2001; Nylund, Asparouhov, Muthén 2007). The final measure in 
Table 2.2, entropy, is not a measure of fit but rather a summary measure of how well 
individuals fit into the classes. Values range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating respondents 
are placed perfectly in their class.  
 We begin examining Table 2.2 by looking at the results of the 2 class LCA. Both 
the AIC and BIC show substantial improvement over the single class model and the LMR 
shows that the single class fits significantly worse. This is not surprising since a single 
                                                            
5 Nevertheless, a change in the likelihood of over 52.192 would indicate a significant improvement of the 
fit (at the .05 level of significance) for 37 parameters. Based on that criterion none of these models would 
be a good fit, in fact not even 7 classes would properly fit the data. 
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class model assumes no correlation among the variables. The 3 class model shows 
improvement in fit over the 2 class model, and although the LMR is close to non-
significance, it still implies the 3 class model is the better model. The four (and five) class 
models show little improvement in the AIC over the 3 class model and actually show a 
worsening of fit for the BIC. Also, the four class model LMR suggests that the 3 class 
model is within statistical significance of having similar fit. Thus, based on all three 
major measures of fit, it appears the 3 class model is the best fitting overall model. As 
well, the four class model provides little new substantive incites over the 3 class model. 
Finally, the entropy value of 0.89 for the 3 class model is high and implies very stable 
classes. That is, the response patterns in the data are statistically distinct. 
--Table 2.3 and Figure 1 about here-- 
 As mentioned earlier, LCA’s have two different model parameters: item 
parameters and class probability parameters (Dayton 1998; McCutcheon 1987, 2002). 
Item parameters are conditional probabilities, or in this case, the probability that a person 
in the class provides the answer in line with DI. Because the indicators are binary, these 
parameters also correspond to the proportion of the class that provided the DI answer. 
The class probability parameters report the sample proportion, or size, of each class. 
Table 2.3 reports the class and item parameters for the three class model and Figure 1 
displays the item parameters graphically.   
Table 2.3 and Figure 1 are linked by the item codes, which follow a simple 3 
letter scheme. The first letter indicates the type of model used in the item: A-assocation, 
F-family change causes development, and D-development causes the family to change. 
The second letter represents the aspect of modernization used in the question: R-rich/poor 
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countries, becoming richer or wealthier, E-educated/uneducated, becoming more 
educated, and D-developed/traditional, developing. The third letter then represents the 
type of family behavior the item uses: M-older age of marriage, W-women getting more 
respect, S-children choosing their own spouse, and C-married couples using 
contraception. The items are grouped first by model type, then development component 
and then ordered by family attribute. Also, there is a horizontal line at probability=0.5 to 
indicate the expected response pattern if the answers were random. 
 The class parameters at the top of Table 2.3 show that three strong, unequally 
sized response groups (or classes) emerge from these data. The largest group, labeled 
class 1, consists of just over half of the sample. Class 2 consists of over 1/3 of the sample 
and class 3 represents just over 9% of the sample6. Based on a respondent’s (typically) 
unique7 response pattern to the 36 items, three individual posterior probabilities are 
estimated for each of the three groups (McCutcheon 1987, 2002; Dayton 1998).  The 
individual is assigned to the class with the highest posterior probability. An indication of 
the strength of these classes is that the average individual class probabilities were all 
between 0.94-0.96. For example, for the half of the sample assigned to group one, the 
average probability of the respondent being in group 1 is 0.96. Thus, generally, the 
probability of being in a class other than the assigned class was extremely low for the 
entire sample. In fact, about 5% of respondents have less than a 70% chance of being in 
                                                            
6 The slight differences between the class proportions reported in Table 3 and Figure 1 are due to Figure 
1’s reporting proportions being based on the estimated model, while Table 3’s class proportions are the 
actual proportions after sorting individuals into the different classes based on their posterior probabilities. 
The closeness of the two sets of proportions reaffirms the strength of the classes. 
7 Of the over 68 billion (236) possible response profiles the respondents provided 424 distinct response 
profiles. This implies that people generally had unique response profiles. Based on these profiles, 13 
people, 2.4% of the sample, provided responses that may indicate they were only providing responses that 
indicated “more” (i.e. more common, more educated, richer, etc). Determining whether this is an indication 
of acquiescence or if it is their true belief is impossible in this study. The response profiles also show that 
no respondent just provided the first response throughout all 36 questions. 
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their assigned class and over half of them have essentially no chance being assigned to a 
different class (i.e. posterior probability≈1). 
Response Group Profiles 
Turning now to the within class item probabilities, Figure 1 indicates that people 
in class 1 consistently provide answers in line with developmental idealism. The item 
probabilities in class 1 range from 0.77-1.00. Considering the items were not always 
presented so that the DI response was first, and one question was worded negatively, this 
implies an incredible amount of support for DI from this group. In fact, the average item 
probability for this group is an amazingly high 0.93. That is, for the approximately 57% 
of the sample that is in class 1, over 93% of the class gave the DI response on any given 
question. Because their positive responses indicate agreement with the statements, one 
might consider people in class 1 to be the strong believers in developmental idealism. 
Based on Thomas (1928) and Merton (1968), we might expect this group to be the most 
likely to act on these strongly held beliefs. 
The respondents in the second group, for the most part, provide item probabilities 
that follow a strikingly similar pattern to the respondents in group 1, but tend to be about 
20 percentage points lower in their probabilities, ranging from 0.53 to 0.87 with an 
average agreement with DI of about 0.74. These results imply that the 34% of the sample 
people found in class 2 still typically support DI, but they are less supportive of DI than 
class 1. It may be that some relationships between family change and development are 
more confusing or more nuanced in ways not identified by this model or by the 36 
questions. Thus, a label for this class may be moderate supporters of DI. Here our theory 
is less clear as to the consequences. For some people the beliefs may be strong enough to 
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act for some behaviors, but not others. Or maybe this group recognizes the ambiguity in 
these models and therefore has a difficult time completely committing to DI. 
The final group of respondents, class 3, characterizes only 9% of the sample, but 
provides a group that, to a limited degree, appears to disagree with DI. Class 3 members 
do not follow a similar response pattern to people in groups 1 and 2. In fact, the great 
variation in the responses makes it difficult to describe. Nevertheless, by focusing on 
larger sections of items, some patterns emerge. First, the association questions (the first 
12 items) tend to have item probabilities around 0.56. This indicates very low support, or 
possibly even random answers to these questions. Similarly, the next 12 items measure 
the model that family change causes development, and show an average item probability 
of 0.47. However, the last set of 12 items, which measure the belief that development 
brings family change, indicate a moderate disbelief in DI with an average probability of 
0.31. This suggests that although people in class 3 may be torn or confused on the items 
measuring the association and family change causing development models, they isagree 
that modernization brings family change8. Thus, these 50 people represent a small 
minority of respondents who not only appear not to support DI, but in the case of the 
model of development bringing family change, they actually disagree with DI. 
 As a general comment on all three groups, the 12 questions about development 
causing family change (the last 12 items in Figure 1) show less item variation than the 
previous 24 questions. This is remarkable because 4 of the questions were asked early in 
the survey, 4 in the middle and 4 near the end. Due in part to the lack of variation within 
class, the three class distinction is strongest in this group. The substantive interpretation 
                                                            
8 It could also be argued that class 3 appears equally unsupportive of the idea that family change will 
increase education, but for the sake of generalization, I leave that discussion for another time. 
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of this pattern may be that the message as to how development changes family is more 
concrete and consistent, and thus believing, or not believing, in it is also more consistent.  
Another interesting note for groups one and two is that although there is high 
support for DI, both groups report lower agreement with questions concerning spouse 
choice. Figure 1 displays this well. By following the dashed and solid lines (groups 1 and 
2 respectively), for each set of four items, the first two and fourth items are high, and the 
third item is often significantly lower. In fact, the average item probability for the spouse 
choice questions for groups 1 and 2 (respectively) are 0.90 and 0.66, while the average 
for the other 3 family types are 0.95 and 0.77.  This pattern is particularly strong for the 
family causing development questions, which suggests respondents are less certain that 
letting young people choose their own spouse will lead to development, wealth and 
education. This may be justified by the fact that parents often arrange the marriage in 
hopes of arranging a happier and better life for the child (and family). Thus, for some, an 
arranged marriage is intended to produce a more “developed” family life in the future.  
As well, the relationships between development and increasing age at marriage, 
using contraception and giving women more respect have all been well discussed in 
Nepal for a significant period, and only recently have ordinary people began to consider 
modernization’s  relationship with spouse choice (Mitchell 2009). Despite the dramatic 
changes in spouse choice in Nepal—20 years ago the vast majority of marriages were 
arranged by parents and now only about 1/3 are completely arranged by parents—most 
marriages are still highly controlled by the parents, and few young people completely 
choose their spouse for themselves (Ghimire et al. 2006; Mitchell 2009). Interestingly, 
within Nepal the people often considered the most “modern” are the high caste Hindus, 
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who also have the highest rates of arranged marriages (Ghimire et al 2006; Mitchell 
2009). Thus, for some people, seeing the most “modern” group having more arranged 
marriages may imply that developed places have arranged marriages. Another 
implication of this response pattern is that is shows that respondents are providing 
thoughtful and consistent answers, and not simply acquiescing. 
Confirmatory Latent Class Analysis 
 An alternative parameterization of the latent class analysis conducted above 
allows for a more structured and confirmatory analysis of the data. By focusing on the 
three models of development I use the 36 questions to place respondents into a matrix of 
groups based on three questions: 1) do they believe family change and development are 
associated 2) do they believe family change causes development and 3) do they believe 
development causes family change. That is, I use the individual’s responses to the 12 
questions asking about if family change will lead to greater development, wealth and 
education to signal if they believe that model (and so on for the other two sets of 12 
survey items). Following this strategy for each of the three questions then I have a total of 
8 (23) possible profiles. This allows to me to examine more completely respondents with 
alternative theories of development compared to the DI model.  
 The results of this analysis (not shown)9 reassert the finding above that the vast 
majority of people in this sample report believing that development and family change 
are associated and that they are both causes and effects of each other. Of the 8 groups 
over 85% of the respondents are in the response profile reporting yes to all three 
modernization models (i.e. association, family causing development and development 
                                                            
9 Although the entropy for this 8 class model is very high (0.985) the larger number of classes and imposed 
structure of the responses provides a worse fit compared the 3 class models above.  
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causing family). Although, as evidenced from the previous analyses, these models of 
modernization are not without some individual variation in terms of what family domains 
are and are not related to development, taken as a whole most people agree with all three 
models.  
 Two other categories of responses also have sizeable numbers of individuals. 
Approximately 5% of the sample reported believing that development and family change 
were associated and that family change caused development but that development did not 
cause family change. This group appears to be a trimmed version of the class 3 discussed 
in the previous LCA. Again, this is a group that appears to support one causal pathway, 
but disputes the other. Similarly, the next largest group (about 4%) reports believing the 
association between development and family change, but only agrees that causation runs 
from development to family change. The remaining 6% are fairly evenly divided between 
the remaining 5 response groups, with only 1.6% reporting not believing in any of the 
three models. 
 Overall, this confirmatory LCA suggests that the third latent class described in the 
first analysis may be a mixture of a number of alternative profiles (compared to those 
who appear to support all three models of development and family life). That is, it 
appears that between 10-15% of the sample believe that at least one of the three models is 
not true. Combining across groups we can see that about 95.1% of the sample report the 
development and family change are associated. Around 93.3% believe that family change 





 In addition to using the 36 items to sort respondents into different groups based on 
their belief in DI, another purpose of this paper uses the items to provide insight into the 
relationships between the measurement concepts. Unlike the previous analyses that 
utilized the multidimential aspects of the data to determine how strongly people believed 
in DI, this analysis emphasizes the components of the different models. That is, do 
respondents’ beliefs about education’s role in family change correlate with their beliefs 
about wealth’s role in family change, etc. Returning to the motivating theory, that 
people’s perceptions of causal patterns may influence behavior, this analysis focuses on if 
people’s perceptions are similar for different models of modernization, social attributes 
and family characteristics. Thus it is an attempt to learn if are all societal changes the 
same, are all family attributes equal and all models of change understood in the same 
way. 
This examination of the conceptual properties of the models is possible only 
because the survey purposefully collected data to cover four different family domains, 
and three modernization types for each of the three models of change (association and 
both causal directions). The relationships within each of the measurement concepts 
(family characteristic, model and type of development), correspond to respondents 
conceptualizations of development and its relationship to family change. For example, do 
education, development and wealth provide similar conceptualizations of societal change 
when family characteristic and model of change are taken into account? Similarly, do 
respondents distinguish between the three models of change, or are the different family 
items treated similarly.  
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 To examine the relationships between the conceptual measures, I rely on classic 
measurement theory, which assumes that an indicator’s variance is a combination of 
systematic variance and random variance—which is often relabeled as measurement error 
(Groves 1989; Alwin 2007). Systematic variance, on the other hand, is the variance of 
interest, and is assumed to be a result of variance in the beliefs of the sample. Recall that 
three topics were addressed in each item: 1) the model of change, 2) the type of 
modernization and 3) the family characteristic of interest. Thus, the systematic variance 
in each item could be divided into those three components. So for each item I estimate a 
model that portions the variance into its random measurement error, and its three types of 
systematic variance. 
Although some of the answers to the questions concerning conceptualizations 
may appear to be discernable from the previous analyses, in fact, they are not apparent 
because of the unique design of the data. Due to the measurement of properties of each 
item, not taking into account each source of variation may provide evidence of false 
relationships—much like not controlling for important covariates in a regression may 
provide evidence of a relationship that is, in reality, spurious. Namely, without 
simultaneously modeling all three sources of systematic measurement variance, the 
relationship within the different sources of variance may be incorrect. For example, if we 
only used the different family characteristics to partition the variance of the data, the 
correlations between the four family characteristics may be due, in part, to correlations 




By dividing the item variance into multiple components, this model approximates 
the Multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) measurement design (Campbell and Fiske 1959). 
Typically, this design explicitly attempts to measure three sources of variance in an 
indicator: the variance of interest (the concept), random error variance, and systematic 
variance not from the concept of interest (nonrandom error). For many studies this 
systematic error not due to the topic of interest is often called a method effect. Most 
MTMM studies then attempt to estimate traits (the concept of interest) removing the 
effects of the method (e.g. asking on a 5-point scale, 11 point scale, etc) and random error 
(Alwin 2007). The MTMM design has been very fruitful in teasing out method effects in 
large scale surveys, as well as helping to determine the reliability and validity of 
indicators (Andrews 1984; Biemer et al 2004; Saris and Andrews 2004; Alwin 2007)10.  
This study stands in contrast to the vast majority of MTMM designs that typically 
have one set of traits and a set of methods, because this study has 3 sets of traits and, 
hence, the standard MTMM method does not apply, and must be modified to fit these 
unique data. Nevertheless, using the same definitions as in the MTMM design I allow for 
all four types of variance for each item. In addition to the random error (eijk), each 
observed measure (Yijk) in this study is a combination of three sources of systematic 
variation: variation due to the ith developmental model (Mi), variation due to the jth 
modernization type (Dj), and variation due to the kth family characteristic (Fk). Which can 
be formulated into the following equation: 
 yijk=bijkMi+gijkDj+lijkFk+eijk,  for all i,j,k, (Eq. 1) 
                                                            
10 Although not of substantive interest here, the validities and reliabilities based on the 3 trait MTMM 
design are reported in Mitchell (2008). In general, the results suggest that most of the items appear to be 
highly reliably and valid (based on the MTMM definitions of reliability and validity). 
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j,eijk)=0, cov(Fk,eijk)=0, and cov(Tijk,eijk)=011
 Coordinating Equation 1 and Figure 2 requires some additional clarification. First, 
the 36 original variables are represented by the 36 rectangles in the middle of Figure 2. 
Second, the 3 types of models of change (association, family change causing 
development and development causing family change) are the row of latent variables 
(ellipses) just above the indicators. Therefore, the effects (b) of model on the observed 
indicators correspond to the solid lines pointing to the top of the indicators. Second, the 
types of modernization (development, wealth and education) are located in the top row of 
ellipses. Their effects (g) are indicated by the dashed lines pointing to the top of the 36 
observed variables. Third, the four family characteristics (marriage timing, respect for 
women, spouse choice and contraceptive use) are represented by the four ellipses under 
the indicators and their effects (l) are solid lines pointing to the bottom of the observed 
variables. Due to lack of space in Figure 2, the random error components for each item 
are not displayed; nevertheless, the random errors are estimated, and are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with everything else. 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first time the MTMM model has been 
modified to study three traits and no method. Some similar work, called multitrait-
multimethod-multitime (MTMMMT) has been used to look at MTMM over time, but 
again, the time was treated as a method effect and not as substantively interesting (Saris 
and Andrews 2004). A clear reason for the lack of research on this is because the data 
design requirements are very stringent (Alwin 2007). This, of course, requires asking 
several very similar questions, which can be burdensome to respondents. 
 
11 Modification indices suggest these assumptions are correct. 
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Also, due to the binary response options in the survey, the observed variables 
violate the assumption of the classic measurement model because they are not continuous 
and normally distributed (Bollen 1989). To compensate for the nonnormality of the data, 
I use the weighted least squares means and variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimator in 
Mplus 5.0 (Muthén 1984; Muthén, du Toit and Spisic 1997; Muthén and Muthén 2006). 
WLSMV uses the diagonal of the weight matrix in the estimation compared to the more 
standard weighted least squares estimator (WLS) that uses the full weight matrix. 
Muthén, du Toit and Spisic (1997) found the WLSMV estimator to be superior to the 
WLS estimator for categorical variables in measurement models. 
--Table 2.4-- 
 Table 2.4 reports the results of the modified MTMM. For this paper, the focus of 
the modified MTMM model is that it allows the domains with each set to correlate with 
each other. So, the different latent measure of type of development can correlate with 
each other, as can the different measures of models of change, but they cannot correlate 
across domains (i.e. education cannot correlate with FCD). Table 2.4 provides three 
correlation matrices on the left side of the table. 
The first matrix on the left, with correlation estimates between the different 
models of change, suggests the people are distinguishing between models of association, 
causation between family change and societal change. All three correlations are low and 
near 0 (from 0.265 to -.037) implying that when all other factors are considered, these 
three models about the relationship between family and social change are not predictive 
of each other. This may seem surprising considering the consistently high values of 
agreement found in Tables 2.1 and 2.3. However, as will be seen below, these 
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correlations are due to the type of development and the family characteristic used. In fact, 
the test to the far right of the first matrix suggests that the hypothesis that these 
correlations are all 0 cannot be rejected at the standard 0.05 level with these data (chi-
square 6, 3 df). Because the correlations are so low, the model fails to converge after 
multiple thousands of iterations when attempting to test the hypothesis that the 3 models 
are perfectly correlated. Most likely this is because the data do not support perfect 
correlation between the three models of change.  
 The second correlation matrix suggests that the perceived types of development 
may be highly correlated. Although the estimates of the correlations are only moderate in 
size (0.51, 0.53 and 0.61), the hypothesis that the correlates could be set to 1 can only be 
rejected at the .015 level of significance. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
correlations could be much higher. This might suggest that the latent measures are almost 
equivalent, although a statistical test shows that they are not quite perfectly correlated 
with each other. In some ways this is not surprising since there is evidence that there 
exists a worldwide view that development consists, in part, of wealth and education 
(UNDP 2003). In fact, previous research shows that, on average, these same respondents 
provide country level measures of development that match those of the UN (Thornton, 
Ghimire and Mitchell 2005). Accordingly, these results suggest that these measures have 
a high level of convergent validity— that the measures are related to measures they 
should be theoretically associated with or measure very similar concepts (Bollen 1989). 
As well, the second test shows a model assuming no association is highly unlikely. 
 The third and final matrix of correlations shows that the latent measures of the 
four family characteristics are highly correlated. Ranging from 0.69 to 0.91, these high 
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correlations suggest that knowing people’s views on one of the four characteristics 
provides a strong prediction of their views on the other three. However, it is important to 
note that statistical tests reject both the model of perfect association and the model of no 
association. Also, from the earlier LCA results, it is not surprising to note that 
correlations between the spouse choice latent measure and the other three family 
characteristics are the lowest of the six correlations. Again, it appears as though spouse 
choice, at least for some people, does not match as well with other family characteristics 
in terms of its fit in DI, implying that some Nepalis may view spouse choice as outside 
the standard developmental models of family change. 
Relating this back to the motivating question of how respondents conceptualize 
developmental models, it may help to recall that for generations, scholars have debated 
the direction of causation between family change and development as well as what family 
behaviors were important and what societal changes constituted development. This 
MTMM analysis offers three important substantive contributions. First, ordinary people 
in Nepal seem to distinguish between models where societal change causes family change 
and models where the causal direction is reversed, with family change causing social 
change. Second, the family behaviors of older age of marriage, lower fertility and gender 
equality (and to a lesser extent spouse choice) are taught as a package, with development 
believed to be positively related to all of them. Third, evidence suggests that respondents 
view increasing wealth and education as very similar to development, or maybe even as 




 This paper combines two powerful and foundational theories of society: 
modernization theory and Thomas’ Theorem on the consequences of perceptions. The 
first is a theory of how societies change, and in particular how family life is both a cause 
and an effect of that social change. Substantial evidence shows that these developmental 
models have been conveyed widely around the world, despite research over the past 50 
years showing their inaccuracies (Boas 1940; Eisenstadt 1964; Gusfield 1967; Portes 
1976; Thornton 2005; Steward 1955; van Nort and Karon 1955; Mills 1959; Crenshaw 
1995; Smits, Ultee and Lammers 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000; York, Rosa, Dietz 
2003; Nisbet 1980; Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; United Nations 1948, 1962, 1979; 
UNDP 2001, 2002). However, as of yet, few people have explored how ordinary 
individuals have understood and accepted these models (Pigg 1992; Ahearn 2004), and 
only until recently has any of this work been using surveys (Binstock and Thornton 2007; 
Yount and Rashad 2008). 
 The second theory comes from W. I. Thomas’ theorem that if a situation is 
perceived as real it is real in its effects on that person (Thomas and Thomas 1928; Merton 
1968). The implication of this theorem is that if people believe these developmental 
models to be real and correct, even if they have been shown elsewhere to be otherwise, 
they will have real consequences on their outcomes. Hence, people who believe that 
making families more modern leads to a more developed (and thus more educated and 
wealthier) nation may marry later, have fewer children, use contraceptives, or in other 
words try to become a modern family, with the expectation of societal modernization. In 
the least they may tolerate changes that they would not have tolerated if they did not 
believe it would make them more developed. Similarly, if people believe development 
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causes family change they may expect that their families will change and thus through 
socialization may pass on those expectations, which in turn promotes the expected family 
change thus producing a self-filling prophecy (Merton 1968). In sum, understanding how 
much people believe in these developmental models may be highly predictive of later 
family attitudes and behavior. 
Using survey data from Nepal, I find high levels of support for the hypothesis that 
people know and believe in these models. First, respondents associate specific family 
characteristics with certain society characteristics. For example, families that tend to be 
modern (i.e. later marriage, smaller families, own spouse selection, high contraceptive 
use, etc) are expected to be found in countries and societies that are rich, developed and 
educated; that is, respondents think developmentally (Thornton, Ghimire, Mitchell 2005). 
Second, most respondents endorse the idea that a modern society causes a modern family, 
and that a modern family causes a modern society. This supports the idea that people are 
aware of developmental models or paradigms and that they believe these models are 
descriptions of how the world really works. The implication being that people with higher 
beliefs in the models may be more likely to have more tolerant attitudes toward changes 
that they expect will make them more modern, and they may also be more likely to 
participate in those behaviors or encourage their families to participate. These results are 
significant because if people believe that either the modern family and modern society 
are good and obtainable—Thornton’s first two propositions (Thornton 2001, 2005)—the 
third proposition provides a model for how to change society as well as how one’s family 
will change as society changes. For example, it means that in order to have a wealthier 
and more educated society individuals may begin having smaller families, waiting longer 
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to marry, etc. This then provides powerful motivations to break from one’s culture and 
adopt new lifestyles.  
However, I also find that a small subset of the sample (between 10-15%), appear 
not to believe in these developmental models. In particular, one group appears to reject 
the idea that education, wealth or development leads to changes in marriage, gender 
equality and contraceptive use, while another, smaller group, appears to reject the reverse 
causal direction. These people who appear to be rejecting some aspects of the 
Developmental Idealism (DI) proposition that the modern family system and modern 
society are both causes and effects of each other provide an interesting comparison group 
to the rest of the sample. Questions of how these groups are different from the main 
sample, if their answers come from a rejection of DI or if they simply have not been 
exposed to it, and finally if their behaviors are different because of this alternative 
perception of the world, are all questions that should be addressed. 
 The results also suggest that respondents distinguish between the different causal 
directions of the developmental models. Had respondents only been using their 
knowledge of which societies contained certain family behavior, we might have expected 
them to supply answers for the two causal directions that were very similar to the 
association questions. Considering the debate among scholars, policy makers and leading 
elites as to which causal model is correct, it is interesting to note that there may be some 
variance in ordinary peoples’ beliefs as to whether family change causes development, or 
development causes family change. 
An additional result of this study is that delaying marriage, having fewer children 
and greater equality between men and women, all appear to have extremely similar, 
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positive relationships with conceptualizations of development. This implies that these 
family outcomes have been well discussed, and are most likely taught as a package of 
family outcomes changed by development, or family changes that must be made to 
become developed. To a lesser extent, spouse choice is similar to the aforementioned 
package of family behaviors. However, spouse choice in Nepal is still undergoing fairly 
recent and rapid change (Ghimire et al 2006; Mitchell 2009). Thus, although the evidence 
is clear that perceived greater control over your own spouse selection is believed to be 
positively related to development, it has not been addressed for as long, or as intensely, as 
fertility, gender equality and marriage timing.   
A final finding is that respondents see development, getting richer, and getting 
more educated as the very similar. Throughout the questionnaire respondents were asked 
to distinguish between educational changes, wealth changes and general development, 
and their responses indicate that most respondents distinguish very little between the 
three. In general, I found that when similar family characteristics and models of change 
are used, education, development and wealth all appear to work in the same way. This 
may suggest that instead of separate concepts, all three are part of an underlying latent 
construct. In fact, the qualitative work conducted prior to the survey found that 
respondents tend to use a broad definition of development that included economic, 
education and even general well-being components to answer questions about societal 
change. This should not be surprising since even the U.N. Human Development Index 
considers development to be comprised of the three separate concepts of education, 
income and health (UNDP 2003). 
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 Despite the strength of the findings there are limitations to this study. First, 
although the Chitwan Valley is an interesting and relevant place to conduct this research, 
these results are probably not generalizable to the entire world. That is, due to the specific 
factors that have created this study site, people may more clearly understand the 
development models, at least as defined here. However, this limitation can be viewed as a 
motivation to determine if these ideas may be understood and accepted in many other 
locations, and that further investigation of a broad range of societies is warranted. 
Another important limitation is that although there is evidence that people believe 
and accept these development models, the thrust of the theory is that believing in these 
models will affect later attitudes, values and behavior. Accordingly, future research on 
examining the effects of these beliefs, or in other words examining the predictive power 
of these measures, is necessary. As well, future research should also address the issue that 
respondents may understand these models, and thus know what answers to provide, but in 
reality do not believe the world follows the developmental model—and thus we would 
expect no effect of the report on later behavior. Nevertheless, in response to the common 
“they are just saying what you want to hear” limitation, some qualitative evidence does 
support the idea that these reports do not just reflect knowledge, but belief as well. 
Nevertheless, I highly encourage further investigation if these beliefs have specific 
behavioral effects later in life. 
A final limitation of this study is that although I attempt to account for much of 
the unique measurement properties of these data by using LCA and the modified MTMM 
design, there are several additional effects that may contribute to systematic error. As 





question ordering are all important method effects. However, for this survey none of 
these methods were varied. Therefore more work should be done to examine other 
important method effects on these new indicators.  
In conclusion, this research has shown that people do appear to believe in these 
development models that have been promoted around the world for centuries. Based on 
Thomas theorem (Thomas and Thomas 1928), and Thornton’s Developmental Idealism 
(Thornton 2001, 2005), then we would expect these beliefs to have implications on 
people’s lives. Understanding how diverse their beliefs are, what they predict, and what 
they are predicted by is an important new area of research.
 
Figure 1. Response Profiles for 3 Latent Classes 
51  * Refer to Table 2.3 for Item definitions. 
 
 

































































































































Table 2.1. Percent of Respondents Providing Developmentally Idealistic Response 
Family Domains 
Association Development Causing Family Family Causing Development 
Wealth Education Development Wealth Education Development Wealth Education Development 
People marry at older ages 73 80 80 75 80 73 89 88 88 
Women treated with more 
respect 80 90 79 90 88 88 88 89 89 
Spouse Choice 66 89 67 82 83 79 70 73 72 
Married couples use 
contraception 81 92 92 81 85 80 89 84 92 
Average percentage 
75 88 80 82 84 80 84 84 85 
81 82 84 
 
* A developmentally idealistic response is one that is in line with the developmental model. 
 
Table 2.2. Model Fit for Models with 1 to 5 Latent Classes Based on 36 Developmental 
Idealism Questions 
 
                                        Number of Latent Classes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Parameters 36 73 110 147 184 
log likelihood -8687.081 -7656.586 -7467.069 -7366.067 -7276.714 
AIC 17446.161 15459.171 15154.139 15026.134 14921.428 
BIC 17600.457 15772.049 15625.599 15656.176 15710.051 
LO-MENDELL-
RUBIN  0 0.0223 0.0762 0.4866 








Table 2.3. Class and Item Parameters for a 3 Class Latent Class Analysis 
Class Parameters Class 1 Class 2 Class 3  
 Class Proportion 0.572 0.335 0.093  
 Class Count 307 180 50  
 Average Class Probability 0.957 0.945 0.940  
Item Parameters 
 Association  Figure One Code 
  Rich      Older age of Marriage 0.873 0.599 0.371 ARM 
      Respect for Women 0.882 0.767 0.392 ARW 
      Spouse Choice 0.777 0.533 0.437 ARS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.921 0.688 0.633 ARC 
  Education      Older age of Marriage 0.919 0.709 0.424 AEM 
      Respect for Women 0.983 0.834 0.636 AEW 
      Spouse Choice 0.993 0.846 0.515 AES 
      Contraceptive Use 0.993 0.868 0.686 AEC 
  
Development      Older age of Marriage 0.877 0.707 0.707 ADM 
      Respect for Women 0.879 0.670 0.713 ADW 
      Spouse Choice 0.769 0.573 0.454 ADS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.979 0.845 0.797 ADC 
 Family Change Causing Development   
  Rich      Older age of Marriage 0.976 0.817 0.599 FRM 
      Respect for Women 0.974 0.777 0.661 FRW 
      Spouse Choice 0.821 0.553 0.498 FRS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.977 0.831 0.624 FRC 
  Education      Older age of Marriage 0.994 0.840 0.393 FEM 
      Respect for Women 0.997 0.864 0.338 FEW 
      Spouse Choice 0.888 0.616 0.174 FES 
      Contraceptive Use 0.978 0.725 0.406 FEC 
  
Development      Older age of Marriage 0.988 0.818 0.483 FDM 
      Respect for Women 0.988 0.817 0.507 FDW 
      Spouse Choice 0.859 0.579 0.393 FDS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.992 0.874 0.613 FDC 
 Development Causing Family Change   
  Rich      Older age of Marriage 0.864 0.677 0.293 DRM 
      Respect for Women 0.997 0.864 0.400 DRW 
      Spouse Choice 0.967 0.707 0.298 DRS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.977 0.670 0.279 DRC 
  Education      Older age of Marriage 0.919 0.749 0.274 DEM 
      Respect for Women 1.000 0.813 0.366 DEW 
      Spouse Choice 0.967 0.757 0.271 DES 
      Contraceptive Use 0.990 0.787 0.202 DEC 
  
Development      Older age of Marriage 0.817 0.694 0.290 DDM 
      Respect for Women 0.984 0.808 0.527 DDW 
      Spouse Choice 0.939 0.692 0.268 DDS 
      Contraceptive Use 0.950 0.710 0.233 DDC 
 
Table 2.4. Correlation Matrices and Tests of Correlations for 3 DI Concepts  
Correlation Matrices Test if correlations=1 Test if correlations=0 







Association 0.145 0.265 
Family Change 
Causing 
Development -0.037 Unable to converge 5.99 3 20.11
Type of Modernization 
Education Development 
Money 0.505 0.526 
Education 0.627 10.51 3 0.015 138.66 3 00.00
Family Characteristic 
Respect for Women Spouse Choice Contraception 
Age of Marriage 0.911 0.812 0.801 
Respect for Women 0.687 0.837 




Tucker-Lewis Index 0.98 
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The Relationship of Social Exclusion and Nonfamily Experiences with Beliefs in 
Developmental Models of Family Change  
 
Abstract 
Believing in models relating family change and societal change has been 
theorized to have substantial effects on behavior (Mitchell 2009; Thornton 
2001, 2005). This paper utilizes a unique data collection effort specifically 
aimed at measuring people’s complex conceptions of the causal 
relationship between family change and “modernization.” Based on their 
responses to 36 survey items, I employ latent class analyses to categorize 
respondents into one of 8 classes of belief in developmental models. Using 
measures based on hypotheses of the effects of social exclusion and 
nonfamily experiences, this paper demonstrates that beliefs in 
developmental models significantly vary by several subpopulations. 
Beliefs in the models are significantly different between castes/ethnicities, 
with the most disadvantaged groups being the most likely to reject aspects 
of the developmental model. Also, more geographically isolated groups 
reject developmental models more often. Respondents with higher levels 




Scholars have focused a great deal on examining the way people understand and 
interpret the world around them (Collins and Makowsky 1998; D’Andrade 1984; Fricke 
1997, Geertz 1973). A key reason for this is that by knowing how people perceive the 
world we can gain a better understanding for why people act in particular ways, 
especially when their actions appear to be contrary to their best interests (Merton 1968; 




Thornton and colleagues has investigated people’s belief in modernization theories, under 
the label of developmental idealism (DI), with the explicit intention of understanding its 
relationship with people’s behavior (Binstock and Thornton 2007; de Jong, Ghimire, 
Thornton and Pierce 2006; Mitchell 2009; Thornton 2001, 2005; Thornton, Ghimire and 
Mitchell 2005; Thornton and Philipov 2009). A basic premise of DI is that by 
understanding the models of social, economic and political change people believe, 
scholars can better comprehend and explain their behavior. 
 To date, research on DI has shown that both leading elites and multiple groups of 
ordinary people understand and accept several components of DI. In particular, people 
think developmentally (or hierarchally) about countries, and believe that both a modern 
society (e.g. places with higher education, greater wealth, more technology, etc) and a 
modern family (e.g. families with older ages of marriage, greater use of contraceptives, 
fewer children, equality for women, etc) are good (Binstock and Thornton 2007; de Jong, 
Ghimire, Thornton and Pierce 2006; Thornton, Ghimire and Mitchell 2005).  As well, 
there is evidence that people believe modern families and modern societies are both 
causes and effects of one another (Mitchell 2009). It is this belief in the causal effects 
between family change and societal change that is key because it suggests that if people 
believe this model to be true, they will act according to its guidelines, regardless of 
whether it is actually true or not (Merton 1968; Mitchell 2009; Thomas and Thomas 
1928).  
 This paper responds to an exigent gap in our knowledge of DI. Previous work 
focusing on the beliefs of individuals about the causal relationships between societal and 




2009). That is, we do not know how these models are understood by socially important 
groups defined by gender, age, education and race/ethnicity. Understanding how different 
people believe in these models is a first step in the larger project of understanding how 
these beliefs may affect behavior. In fact, this is the first examination of characteristics 
related to people’s belief in these modernization models.  
To make this increase in our knowledge, I take advantage of a unique data 
collection in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal. This valley and Nepal in general, has recently 
undergone dramatic social and economic changes. As I l describe further below, these 
changes have created key disparities in access to the institutions and individuals most 
likely to promulgate the modernization paradigm. Previous work with this sample has 
shown significant variation in the amount of belief in these models, pointing to possibly 
important differences in beliefs by subpopulations as well (Mitchell 2009). Further, I rely 
on a unique survey of 537 people in Chitwan that measured respondent’s beliefs in the 
causal relationships between family and societal change. This survey questioned 
respondents using multiple societal and family characteristics and related them in 
multiple causal pathways.  
Theory and Background 
In a recent stream of theorizing, Thornton (2001, 2005) argues that a package of 
ideas he calls developmental idealism (DI) was disseminated widely around the world 
where it has been a major force for family and demographic change.  The elements of 
developmental idealism can be defined broadly to include most of the ideational factors 
posited in the literature as being important influences on family and demographic 




beliefs that are used either directly or indirectly in most of the ideational literature 
explaining family and demographic change. It also adds something that is missing from 
the literature—a reason why the non-Western world would care about, and be influenced 
by, Western and/or modern ideas. That is, it supplies a reason for why people would 
redefine their situations and therefore act in accordance with new values and predictions. 
It also brings into the picture such ideational forces as the desire for a higher standard of 
living, desires for freedom and equality, an emphasis on individual agency rather than 
fatalism, individualism, skepticism about authority and institutions, the empowerment of 
women and the younger generation, and desires for small families, mature marriage, and 
acceptance of fertility control.   
In this section I briefly highlight the basic ideas underlying societal 
developmental models and explain how they provide an important framework for 
understanding and dealing with the world, including family structure and relationships. It 
is important to note that I do not necessarily approve of the ideas behind DI, but rather 
argue that they are a powerful set of models that when defined as real and important, may 
have significant effects on decisions that may lead to important family (and non-family) 
behaviors. 
Thornton (2001, 2005) argues that the modernization and development theories 
used by past social scholars created a set of propositions that have been a force for family 
change during the last two centuries. These developmental models and their conclusions 
provided new rubrics for judging society, family life, and the rights of human beings. 
They showed a new predicted direction for future family and social change and the 




engine for many social, economic, and familial changes. More specifically, this set of 
four interrelated propositions, which he calls DI, states that: 1) a modern society that is 
industrialized, urbanized, highly educated, and with high levels of technology is good and 
to be sought after; 2) modern families, defined as having high levels of individualism, 
high status of women, mature marriage, marriage arranged by the couple, high youth-
autonomy, small households, and controlled and low fertility are preferred family types; 
3) modern society and modern family are causally connected, with a modern society 
being a cause and effect of a modern family system; and 4) individuals have the right to 
be free and equal. Thornton (2001, 2005) argues that DI was disseminated widely around 
the world—through a myriad of mechanisms such as scholarly publications, Christianity, 
political movements, US foreign policy programs, and the United Nations —and has been 
an exceptionally powerful force for family change during the 1800s and 1900s. He argues 
that it has been a particularly important force in many family changes during this period, 
including declines in childbearing and increases in age at marriage, the autonomy of 
young people, egalitarianism, divorce, independent living, sexual activity and 
cohabitation outside marriage, and growing emphasis on individual rights. 
Although all four propositions of the theory are important, this paper argues that 
the third proposition, that family change and societal change are causally related is a 
particularly critical element. Based on W.I. Thomas’ Theorem (Thomas and Thomas 
1928), that when people define a situation as real they act as though it is—regardless of if 
it is or not, it follows that if people believe in a specific causal model between family 
change and development, they will behave in accordance with that model. Thus, even 




development are not accurate, people will act as though they are (Laslett 1983; 
Macfarlane 1978; Hajnal 1965; Wrigley and Schofield 1981). If people expect family 
change, from historical family types to “modern” family types (later marriage, fewer 
children, more egalitarian gender roles, less parental control, etc), to increase 
development, then they will change their families to be more modern. Similarly if people 
believe modernization makes families more developed, they will change their families to 
be in line with their more developed society. 
Existing Evidence about Beliefs in Developmental Models 
Several studies have shown that developmental models have dominated social 
science thinking for most of the past quarter millennium (Harris 1968; Mandelbaum 
1971; Nisbet 1969; Sanderson 1990; Thornton 2001, 2005). It is only in the last few 
decades that the developmental or modernization paradigm has been strongly 
challenged—and even discredited—and many of the conclusions of the generations of 
scholars shown to be myths. Thus, for hundreds of years these models were circulated 
without extensive challenge. It has also been documented that European travelers, 
colonial administrators, leaders of the feminist movement, and family planning advocates 
have relied heavily on developmental arguments (Thornton 2001, 2005). In addition, the 
role of developmental models has been important in the documents of the United Nations, 
numerous governments, including those of China and the United States, and international 
nongovernmental organizations (Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 1980; UNDP 
2001, 2002; United Nations 1948, 1962, 1979).   
There is also limited evidence from ordinary people that is consistent with the 




India, China, Nepal, and New Guinea have reported examples of ordinary people using a 
developmental or hierarchical framework in evaluating various attributes and behavior 
(Ahearn 2004; Amin 1989; Blaut 1993; Caldwell et al. 1988; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Pigg 
1992; Wang 1999). For example, in Nepal, Pigg (1992) and Ahearn (2004) use 
ethnographic data to show that in some rural areas of Nepal, people use developmental 
thinking to compare urban and rural life and to think about marriage and other aspects of 
family life. While these studies have documented that people associate some family types 
with some society types, primarily focusing on urban and rural differences within the 
country, they have not explored people’s understanding of the causal relationships 
between society type and family. As well, they have typically explored a limited range of 
society and family types.   
More recent work by Thornton and colleagues have explored this area in greater 
detail (Thornton 2001, 2005; Thornton, Ghimire and Mitchell 2005; de Jong, Ghimire, 
Thornton and Pierce 2006; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Thornton and Philipov 2009). 
For example, Thornton, Ghimire and Mitchell (2005) find strong evidence that a sample 
of people in Nepal understood the developmental paradigm well enough to provide 
development scores that correlated highly (both at the aggregate and individual levels) 
with the UN Human Development scores for a diverse list of countries. Using the same 
sample in Nepal, de Jong, Ghimire, Thornton and Pierce (2006), show that Nepalis value 
modern family characteristics such as later marriage, child choice marriages, fewer 
children and even an increased tolerance toward divorce. Nevertheless, this research does 
not provide an examination of people’s beliefs in the causal relationships between 




In work that specifically addresses the issue of causation, Mitchell (2009) shows 
that people are able to distinguish between the different causal models (i.e. family change 
causing development versus development causing family change). As well, he documents 
that individuals do not easily distinguish between descriptors of societal development 
such as wealth, education and development. This study also showed that there is variation 
in beliefs within a Nepali sample. That although 85-90% of the sample supported the 
concept of development and family change being causally connected, some people 
rejected that belief. In fact, the motivating force behind this paper is to distinguish which 
subgroups (if any) are more likely to support the causal models and which are more likely 
to reject it. 
Explanations for subgroup variation 
 There are several possible explanations for subgroup variation in the belief in 
developmental models. For my purposes, I am particularly interested in theory of group 
variation that arises from  the normlessness often generated by rapid social change—like 
that of Nepal’s recent past (Durkheim 1984; Park, Burgess and McKenzie 1925). I 
contend that Robert Merton’s (1938) theory on the rejection of norms appropriately fits 
this situation. Merton (1938) postulated that it is the combination of the knowledge of 
cultural goals and models, and the availability of resources to obtain those goals that 
leads to an acceptance of the socially prominent model of norms, expectations and 
behavior. He argued that although a constant message of culture norms, or models of the 
world, may be provided to society, without the ability to comply with those models, 
people will often reject the goals, the means, or both. For Merton, conformity comes only 




means—often through social exclusion—or the goals and models—normally through a 
lack of contact with the ideas—will seem to have a different set of norms, values and 
models of the way the world works. 
 Based on this theory, then, the study location must have three components. First 
the study location must have recent social change. Second, the location must have 
striking social exclusion. And third, the location must have substantial variation in 
exposure to the model or set of norms (in this case DI). In the paragraphs below I detail 
how the study location of Nepal fits all three requisite aspects of the theory to provide a 
vivid test site for examining subgroup variation in belief of DI. 
Social change 
Nepal was kept in isolation from the rest of the world until the 1950s (Adhikari 
1998). The historical isolation, extreme exploitation by the ruling elite, the Hinduization 
of the non-Hindu population, and the rugged Himalayan topography with few roads and 
communication resources have had an enduring influence on many aspects of Nepali life. 
Nepal currently ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world. Over 85 percent of the 
population still lives in rural areas with no all-weather roads, poor public education, few 
health services and limited communication technology. More than half of the population 
is still illiterate. In addition, several attributes of the family that are labeled by DI as 
traditional have historically characterized Nepal and are still common. These include 
extended households, early age at marriage, arranged marriage, parental control over 
children, and low status of women.  
The data for this research were collected in Chitwan Valley, which lies in the 




settlement; prior to this it was covered with dense tropical forest. Chitwan soon became a 
social melting pot, receiving migrants from all over the country. The valley has become 
connected to the rest of the country by all-weather roads, making it a business hub for the 
country. Furthermore, there has been a massive expansion of schools, health services, 
markets, bus services, cooperatives, and employment centers in Chitwan (Axinn & 
Yabiku, 2001). Previous work in Chitwan shows that there has been a sharp increase in 
school enrollment, visits to health clinics, family planning, employment outside of the 
home, development programs, and exposure to different sources of mass media and new 
ideas in recent birth cohorts (Axinn & Barber, 2001; Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Barber et al. 
2001; Beutel and Axinn 2002; Ghimire et al., 2006). Despite this general increase, 
however, much of this research has also demonstrated that access to these institutions, 
programs, and information is still highly heterogeneous due to both spatial and cultural 
barriers. Thus, this setting is particularly helpful by affording access to a broad range of 
people whose different cultural settings and differential contact with the aforementioned 
institutions, programs, and information can produce a possibly wide range of beliefs in 
developmental models. Despite historical philosophies that were unambiguously in 
opposition to developmental models, developmental idealism is now pervasive within 
Nepal (Ahearn 2004; Bista 1972, 1991). The model of norms, expectations and behavior 
provided by DI is a prominent, if not the main, paradigm by which people are expected to 
operate (Ahearn 2004; Mitchell 2009; Pigg 1992; Thornton 2001, 2005; Thornton, 
Ghimire and Mitchell 2005; de Jong, Ghimire, Thornton and Pierce 2006).  
Social change, particularly rapid social change like that experienced by Nepal, has 




choices are influenced by prior experiences, and thus, even in universal exposure to 
social change, reactions will differ due to an individual’s past (Brofenbrenner, 1979; 
Elder, 1977, 1978). Thus in any study assuming social change as a possible cause of 
current conditions, it is important to recognize that the differences may be simply due to 
people’s past experiences. Studies that allow for the measurement of the timing of these 
experiences are particularly helpful in providing a careful examination of the data 
through the life-course perspective. For example, due to the remarkable increases in 
education, transportation and health-care infrastructure in the Chitwan valley over the last 
few decades, the opportunities and resources of a 20 year-old today and one even 20 
years ago are tremendously different and significant (Axinn and Yabiku 2001). In 
particular, DI is assumed to be a strongly socialized message that may reach almost 
everyone now, but 20 years ago may have only been accessible to the educated, urban 
elite. As well, more recent birth cohorts had fewer competing paradigms to DI. Thus, we 
would expect birth year (i.e. birth cohort) to be a strong indicator of acceptance of DI, 
with more recent birth years being more accepting, due to earlier exposure to DI. 
H1: People of different birth cohorts will experience different levels of rejection 
of the development models 
Social exclusion 
Like most other societies, Nepal has subpopulations that have been excluded from 
the requisite resources needed to accomplish societal or personal goals (Silver 1995; 
Power and Wilson 200; Pradhan 2009). In this case, social exclusion often entails 
societies pushing the most vulnerable, complicated, and trouble-some populations 




pushing to the furthest, most rural areas, or it can be a less physical, but still real, 
isolation by placing social barriers to their entry into the mainstream.  
Regardless of the mechanism, these groups lack the ability to fully comply with 
the expectations of society even if they accept the goals and norms of society (Merton 
1938). In turn, this can lead a rejection of all or part of the society’s ideal model of life, 
thus producing variation in beliefs and often variations in behavior as well. For this 
paper, I hypothesize that socially isolated groups are more likely to reject the model of 
developmental idealism either wholesale, or in part.  
H2: Socially excluded groups are more likely to reject developmental idealism. 
For this paper, I emphasize three classifications of social exclusion or isolation: 
gender, caste and geography. Gender relations in Chitwan, as in most of Nepal, are 
characterized by strong patriarchal hierarchies, prevalent gender bias and powerful 
gender-specific norms, resulting in dramatically different social, health and demographic 
outcomes for men and women (Ahearn 2004; Bennett; Leone, Matthews and Zuanna 
2007; Macfarlane 1986). Compared to men, women typically have lower status, and thus 
often do not have the access to the same resources as their male counterparts (Acharya 
1981; Caldwell 1983; Dyson and Moore 1983; Ghimire et al. 2006). This is especially 
true for access to family resources (Leone, Matthews and Zuanna 2007). Therefore, I 
expect women to be more likely to reject DI. 
Another important measure of social exclusion is caste (Bennett 1983; Bista 1972; 
Goldstein 1986; Hofer 1979; Levine 1987; Pradhan 2009; Stash 2001). Since the mid-19th 
century the current caste system has been a primary determinant of location within the 




and Nepalization, the caste groups still show significant differences in behavior, in part as 
a result of differential access to political, economic, and social resources (Pradhan 2009; 
Stash 2001). In fact, in Nepal, the Leader of State was considered a Hindu god until 1991, 
making all aspects of Hindu life (including caste structure, exclusion and isolation) a 
matter of law and government (Bista 1972, 1991). 
Although caste is extremely complex, a common classification is into five major 
groups: high-caste Hindu, low-caste Hindu, Newar, Hill Tibeto-Burmese, and Terai 
Tibeto-Burmese (Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Ghimire et al. 2006). The first two groups 
both have similar origins from India and both practice the Hindu religion, but the former 
has had much greater access to political, economic and social resources. Newars are 
unique in that they practice elements of both Buddhism and Hinduism. Despite being 
native to the Kathmandu Valley, due to their extensive involvement in the business sector 
of Nepal, they can be found all over Nepal. The Hill Tibeto-Burmese group is primarily 
from Tibet and typically practice Buddhism. Finally, the Terai Tibeto-Burmese groups 
are the native inhabitants of the Chitwan Valley, and were pushed to the edge of the 
valley to make room for the large immigration of “Hill” people (especially High Caste 
Hindus and Hill-Tibeto Burmese). In particular, the Tharu ethnic group makes up about 
75% of the Terai Tibeto-Burmese group in Chitwan. This native group or janajati is one 
of the most disadvantaged groups in Nepal. Among the five groups, people within the 
Low-caste Hindu and and Terai Tibeto-Burmese groups are expected to have the lowest 
support of DI. 
Finally, due to poor transportation infrastructure, geographic distance is a 




and markets (Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Brauner-Otto, Axinn and Ghimire 2007; Yabiku 
2006). Generally, moving closer to the city increases both the variety and quantity of the 
resources. Thus, the further someone is away from the city, the more likely we would 
expect them to reject the prominent DI model, because they are unable to access the 
requisite resources to obtain the goals and expectations of the DI model. For example, 
given two people with equal knowledge of DI, the person living closer to health centers, 
where they can obtain birth control, or industry, where they can locate jobs, or schools, 
were they can acquire training, will be more likely to support DI because they have 
greater means of achieving DI’s goals.  
Of course an important alternative explanation for the correlation between 
geographic isolation and disbelief in DI is that those with very different beliefs about the 
world purposefully isolate themselves from the main population. Thus, it would be the 
ideas that caused the social exclusion, and not the other way around. This alternative 
explanation is much less of an issue with caste or gender differences because the 
characteristics used to define those groups are not within the control of the individual. 
Finally, an additional complication is that the resources used to obtain the goals of DI, 
probably promote DI as well, thus conflating access to the means to obtain the goals and 
access to learning about the goals. Thus, to properly examine the influence of geographic 
distance we also need to examine access to the knowledge of the model; the following 
paragraphs do just that. 
Ideational exposure 
 The second aspect of Merton’s (1938) theory requires that people have knowledge 




framework for access to ideas is the modes of social organization framework proposed by 
Thornton and Fricke (Thornton and Fricke 1987; Thornton et al 1994). The modes of 
organization framework emphasizes the social organizations that manage and influence 
individual’s values, behavior and interpersonal relationships. The primary focus of this 
framework is the extent to which activities, resources, relationships, beliefs and control 
are organized within family or kinship units in lieu of nonfamily institutions such as 
schools, nonfamily work, mass media, and governmental agencies. Although not 
constrained by urban/rural divides, this framework has proved particularly fruitful in rural 
settings, where family modes of organization are typically very prominent (Ghimire et al. 
2006; Thornton and Lin 1994). Thus, I expect that access to, and experience with, 
nonfamily institutions provides an important alternative to the family organization of life, 
and therefore should positively influence the acceptance of the developmental models. 
Conversely, I expect those who have had more family experiences, such as expanding 
family networks and responsibilities through marriage or childbearing, will be more 
likely to reject the developmental models. 
H3a: People with more nonfamily experiences will be less likely to reject 
development idealism. 
H3b: People with more family experiences will more likely to reject development 
idealism. 
As with geographic isolation, it is reasonable that these beliefs may operate to 
promote nonfamily experience. Specifically, believing in the developmental models of DI 




nonfamily work. Thus, any correlation discovered here may be a result of the belief (or 
rejection) of DI promoting (or hindering) participation in nonfamily experiences.  
Nonfamily experiences 
A respondent’s educational experience has been a primary measure of nonfamily 
experiences (Caldwell 1982; Ghimire et al. 2006; Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994; Yabiku 
2006). Often the ideas introduced in schools promote values of individualism, equality 
and autonomy (Caldwell 1982; Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 1988; Mirowsky and Ross 
2007; Ramírez, Suárez and Meyer 1997; Thornton 2001; Thornton 2005). Based on my 
own experience both talking with Nepalis and seeing some school textbooks, it is clear 
the developmental models are a primary focus of the education in at least some schools. 
In line with the hypothesis above, those with higher levels of education are expected to be 
less likely to reject DI. 
Similarly, nonfamily work is also an important measure of nonfamily experiences 
because it provides an additional opportunity for exposure to new ideas (Ghimire et al. 
2006; Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994), and in particular, developmental idealism 
(Thornton 2001, 2005). In nonfamily work, by definition, not all coworkers are from the 
same family. This provides greater diversity of ideas, knowledge and experience. As 
well, nonfamily work often requires regular travel from home to work which also 
normally exposes the individual to a greater breadth of ideas than provided at home. 
Thus, we would expect those individuals with nonfamily work to have greater acceptance 
of DI due to the greater exposure to DI. 
Mass media in Nepal, including radio, television and movies, generally put 




and Barber 2001; Janowitz 1981) (Thornton 2001, 2005). Thus, a direct mechanism of 
exposure to the ideas of DI is the frequency of contact with mass media. Based on 
Hypothesis 3a, then, we would expect people with higher frequency of mass media 
consumption will be more likely to support DI. 
Family experiences 
Although there are many family experiences, I emphasize three that are 
particularly useful in this study: being married, number of children ever born, being in a 
polygamous marriage. Marriage is the most important organizing influence in Nepali life 
as it aligns hierarchies and establishes kinship and intergenerational relationships (Ahearn 
2004; Ghimire et al. 2006; Yabiku 2006). If marriage promotes greater ties to the 
family—as well as greater responsibilities to kin—then we would expect married people 
to be more likely to reject DI. Another strong influence on family organization in Nepal 
is fertility (Axinn and Barber 2001). If greater numbers of children tend to pull people 
toward family modes of organization, then people with more children would be expected 
to reject DI more often. As well, fertility is particularly important because DI has strong 
preferences for small families (Thornton 2001, 2005). In parallel, DI has very strong 
negative views about polygamy (Thornton 2005). Polygamous families are now less 
common in Nepal, but being a part of one seems to instill greater family organization. 
Thus, we would expect people in polygamous marriages to reject DI more often.  
DATA and METHODS 
Sample Design 
In 2003, researchers chose the Western Chitwan Valley for this study. They 




they sampled 2-4 neighborhoods, consisting of 4-25 households from each stratum.  
Finally, once a neighborhood was selected, all the individuals age 17 and above residing 
in those neighborhoods were interviewed.  This sampling procedure resulted in slightly 
more than 100 individuals being selected from each of the five strata. These people were 
interviewed in face-to-face interviews in the Nepali language using paper and pencil 
format. Three respondents who could not be interviewed in Nepali were excluded from 
this analysis. The field period lasted for six weeks and resulted in a 97 percent response 
rate. 
Measurement 
Models of Modernization 
In this paper I focus on 9 sections of questions investigating knowledge and belief 
in developmental models and their application in concrete situations. Together these 9 
sections systematically document peoples’ beliefs in the correlation and causal 
relationship between family change and social change. Knowing that respondents may 
not all view development the same, researchers also took care to ask about three different 
aspects of modernization (education, getting richer, and development). As well, 
researchers asked about three different models of change or modernization (family type is 
correlated with society type, social change causes family change and family change 
causes societal changes).  Four family domains (marriage timing, gender equality, spouse 
choice and contraceptive use) were asked in all nine sections12. Thus, there is an analytic 
subset of (3x3x4) 36 questions. Appendix A provides the exact wording, distributions and 
coding of each of these measures. 
                                                            
12 Mitchell (2008) shows that these four family domains are an excellent representation of 13 family 




More specifically, three of the sections in the survey presented one of four family 
characteristics (e.g. marrying at older ages, spouse choice, etc) and then asked if this 
characteristic is more common in different places or types of societies. There were three 
location comparisons possible in the three sections:  1) rich versus poor places; 2) 
developed versus traditional places; and 3) educated versus uneducated places. The 
respondents could specify that a characteristic was more common in one location (e.g. a 
rich place) or in the other location (e.g. a poor place). Respondents could also volunteer 
that the family trait was “equally common in both” or that they “don’t know,” but only 
after a follow-up probe asking the respondent to give their best guess or estimate. 
Together, researchers intended these three sections to measure if survey respondents 
expected specific family types to be associated with different places, that is, did they see 
an association between family type and society type. Thus, this could be seen as a test of 
developmental thinking—without any specific causal model for family and societal 
changes.   
 Similarly, three other sections presented the same family characteristics as above 
and then asked if making the country more developed, richer, or more educated would 
make people marry earlier or later, have more or fewer children, etc. Also responses of 
“no change” or “don’t know” were accepted if the respondents voiced them after a follow 
up probe asking them to give their best guess or estimate. These three sections 
specifically measure if the survey respondents understand or believe that societal change 
(becoming richer, more developed or more educated) would cause family changes. This 
measure helps examine if respondents believe that family change is a result of 




 Finally, the last three sections reverse the causal relationship between family 
change and modernization. These sections ask if changing various family characteristics 
(people marrying later, having larger families, etc) would make the Nepal richer, a better 
place13, or more educated. As with the previous sets of sections, people were allowed to 
provide the options of “no change” and “don’t know” as a response after probing. These 
three sections of questions provide an estimate of the individual’s belief that specific 
family change leads to a more modern society. 
To analyze the questions, they were coded so that 1 meant the answer was in line 
with developmental thinking and everything else—including answers of “don’t know,” 
“the same,” “no change,” and missing—was coded as 0 (see Appendix A for all the 
question-specific coding). It is important to note that there was typically only one to three 
percent of the sample that provided responses other than the two provided options. Also, 
only 1 person refused to provide an answer or gave uncodeable response and this only 
occurred on one of the 36 questions.  
--Table 3.1 about here-- 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are derived directly from the motivating theory that 
family and non-family experiences, social exclusion and birth cohort influence the belief 
in the different models of development as suggested by developmental idealism. Table 
3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for each of these measures. For example, to 
examine the importance of social change, I use four equal sized birth cohort groups with 
the most recent birth cohort (1980-1985) acting as the comparison group. 
                                                            
13 Based on in-depth interviews and focus groups the idea of a better place and developed place are very 




 In line with the discussion above, I have three measures of social exclusion. 
Gender and caste are both self-reported during the survey. Specifically for caste, I use the 
five category measure of caste previously described, with High-caste Hindus as the 
comparison group. To measure variation in geographic exclusion or isolation I use the 
approximate distance in miles from the respondent’s neighborhood to the main city of 
Narayanghat, in the Northeast corner of the study area. 
 I operationalize nonfamily experiences with three measures. First, I use a measure 
of completed years of schooling, where the average number of years of school for the 
sample is about 5.1 years. Second, I measure nonfamily work experience using three 
exclusive categories as reported by the respondent: never worked for pay (71%), have 
worked for pay, but not doing so now (16%) and am now working for pay (13%). Finally, 
third, I measure mass media consumption, including radio, television and movies. Based 
on self reports of average media consumption over the last 12 months, I code exposure to 
radio, movie and television: listening to the radio (0=never/rarely 1=daily/weekly), 
attending the movies (number of movies up to 7), and watching television 
(0=never/rarely, 1=weekly/monthly). 
 I also have three measures of family experiences: ever married, number of 
children, and ever been in a polygamous marriage. First, I use the self-reported measure 
of if the respondent has ever been married. Second, I measure the number of children 
born to the respondent as measured by the question “All together how many births have 
you had?” Third, I measure polygamy by combining responses to two questions: one for 
men, “In this study, we are talking with a variety of people.  Some marry than once.  Did 




we are talking with a variety of people.  Have you ever had a co-wife?” 17% of 
respondents reported yes to one of the questions above, thus indicating they were in some 
form of a polygamous union. 
Analytic Strategy 
 As a first step in predicting belief in developmental models, I conduct a latent 
class analysis (LCA) using the 36 binary indicators just discussed. LCA aids in the 
characterization of a multidimensional set of observed binary variables (McCutcheon 
1987, 2002). That is, in lieu of assuming the 36 questions provide multiple dimensions of 
intensity of belief (i.e. believing that education causes family change, getting married 
later causes development, etc), I can use the questions to find typologies of responses, or 
response profiles. For example, two very obvious groups would be those who provide 
answers suggesting a belief in developmental idealism and those whose answers imply 
disbelief in DI. Several other groups may exist, such as: those who believe in one causal 
direction over another, believing some family types may be affected while other family 
characteristics remain unchanged, etc. By examining the classes of responses we can 
better understand the extent of the belief in the various aspects of DI. Thus, by combining 
multiple indicators in the LCA we can gain a better comprehension of how consistent 
respondents are in the beliefs of models of modernization. Using this approach also helps 
eliminate the noise due to measurement error on any one indicator by having multiple 
questions (Alwin 2007). 
 This analysis builds off of previous work showing that respondents do distinguish 
between the three models of modernization (modern family and modern society are 




(Mitchell 2009). This previous work also shows that although the majority of people 
supported all three models of modernization, some respondents appear to reject, or at 
least not fully support, all three models. With this knowledge, I have designed a 
confirmatory LCA where I structure the possible response profiles or groups. Thus, 
whereas a standard LCA uses model fit to determine the best number of classes, I am 
using the respondents’ answers to determine which one of the predetermined response 
classes is the best fit for the respondent.14 
--Table 3.2 about here-- 
By focusing on the three models of development I use the 36 questions to place 
respondents into a matrix of groups based on three questions: 1) do they believe family 
change and development are associated 2) do they believe family change causes 
development and 3) do they believe development causes family change. That is, I use the 
individual’s responses to the 12 questions asking about if family change will lead to 
greater development, wealth and education to signal if they believe that model (and so on 
for the other two sets of 12 survey items). Following this strategy for each of the three 
questions then I have a total of 8 (23) possible profiles (see Table 3.2). This allows to me 
to examine respondents with alternative theories of development compared to the DI 
model.  
As shown in Table 3.2, the results of this analysis reassert Mitchell’s (2009) 
finding that the vast majority of people in this sample report believing that development 
                                                            
14 There are several other options for measuring the belief in developmental models using these 36 items, 
with two obvious choices being confirmatory factor analysis and linear regression on the summed scores. 
Both of these methods were tested and resulted in the exact same substantive results. However, considering 
the strong violations of normality and continuousness of the dependent variable for both of these models, 
the LCA is the most trustworthy method (Alwin 2007, McCutcheon 1987, 2002; Muthén, du Toit and 




and family change are associated and that they are both causes and effects of each 
other15. Of the 8 groups over 85% of the respondents are in the response profile reporting 
“yes” to all three modernization models (Class 1). Although these models of 
modernization are not without some individual variation in terms of what family domains 
are and are not related to development, taken as a whole most people agree with all three 
id not 
that 





distinguish those who reject some aspect of the development idealism model. This 
                                                           
models.  
 Two other categories of responses also have sizeable numbers of individuals. 
Approximately 5% of the sample reported believing that development and family change 
were associated and that family change caused development but that development d
cause family change (Class 7). Similarly, the next largest group (about 4%) reports 
believing the association between development and family change, but only agrees 
causation runs from development to family change (Class 8). 1.5% of respondents 
reported not believing in any of
range of 0-2% of respondents. 
 Do to the small samples, using these 8 groups of responses to examine the exte
to which different subgroups approve or reject the different developmental models is
statistically flawed. Attempting to distinguish subgroup variation in beliefs in the 8 
different models would be very difficult to detect with groups only having single digi
cell sizes. However, it is useful to examine who supplies an alternative model to the 
developmental idealism model that modern family and modern society are correlat
reciprocally causally related. Thus, by collapsing classes 2-8 into one group I can 
 
15 Although the entropy for this 8 class model is very high (0.985), suggesting most respondents had very 
low probabilities of being in a class other than the one they were assigned, the larger number of classes and 




categorization results in a sufficiently large group of people who, based on 36 questions, 
reject some aspect of the developmental model.  
--Table 3.3 about here-- 
 Table 3.3 provides the estimated odds of rejecting any part of the DI 
developmental model. Of the 537 respondents, 78 (15%) reported rejecting at least one of 
the three models, or in other words, they suggested an alternative model to the full DI 
model of modernization. The four logistic regression models in Table 3.3 examine the 
four blocks of measures that coordinate with the different hypothesis presented above.  
Although the first three blocks of measures are tested individually (logistic 
regression models 1-3), cohort is included in all models. This is done to reflect the 
importance of the social change and the life-course in all of the models. Remember that 
H1 stated that cohort would be significantly associated with belief in DI, with younger 
cohorts being more likely to accept DI. However, examining the effects in model 4 shows 
that although there may be some differences in beliefs of the DI models, those differences 
are apparently not large enough to notice in these models. As well, I tested a parallel 
coding (age) including a linear effect, and a curvilinear effect, neither of which showed 
any significant result or substantive pattern. The dramatic change in both education 
(increase) and fertility (decrease) across cohorts explains nearly all of the bivariate effect 
of birth cohort. This suggests that the changes we see across birth cohorts (or age since 
this is a cross-sectional study) are due to changes in access to education and to the 
reduction of fertility—both of which decreased the amount of control the family had over 




Model 1 presents the coefficients for variables associated with social exclusion. 
Recall that H2 hypothesized that socially excluded groups are more likely to reject 
developmental idealism, and that our measures of gender, caste and distance to the major 
city Narayanghat were all intended to measure socially excluded groups. Looking at 
model 1, the results suggest that all of the groups we would have expected to be more 
likely to reject some aspect of the model seem positively inclined to do so. In particular, 
caste is a powerful indicator of rejecting some part of the DI model. Specifically the 
Low-caste Hindus and the Terai Tibeto-Burmese16, the two most disadvantaged of the 
five caste groups, are significantly more likely to reject the DI model of modernization. 
These results remain even after controlling for family and non-family experiences. Also, 
being female and living further away from Narayanghat both have the expected positive 
direction on rejecting DI in model 1. However, neither is significant after controlling 
other variables in model 4 (primarily due to the strong effects of education and its high 
correlation with gender and distance to the city). These results suggest that some 
subgroups may be experiencing social exclusion and thus rejecting some aspects of the 
modernization model as outlined by DI. 
Model 2 presents the results of the measures of nonfamily experience. Remember 
that H3a postulated that more contact with nonfamily experiences would reduce the 
likelihood of rejecting the developmental model. More explicitly, that higher education, 
nonfamily work and media consumption would reduce some of the risk of rejecting the 
DI model of modernization. The results in models 2 and 4 support the notion that higher 
levels of education and media consumption (particularly T.V.) result in greater support 
                                                            
16 Looking at Table 3.3 reveals that due to small cell sizes (particularly within caste groups) the 
coefficients are exceptionally large. Nevertheless, while I do not place a great deal of weight on the 




for all three components of the DI model. The effect of education is particularly 
important in that for every 1 year of school there is an expected reduction in the odds of 
rejecting the model by around 20%. To help interpretation, a quick transformation of the 
coefficient shows that a difference of 6 years makes those with fewer years of schooling 
3.5 times more likely to reject the DI model. Thus, the evidence confirms H3a, that 
higher levels of nonfamily experience increases acceptance of DI. 
Model 3 presents the coefficients of the measures of family experiences, which as 
stated in H3b, we expect to have a positive relationship with rejecting DI. The effects in 
Model 3 are all positive as expected, but only the number of children has a significant 
effect (each child increasing the odds of rejecting by 19%). However, by model 4 none of 
the effects are significantly different from no effect (i.e. 1). Again this is due to the 
inclusion of education, which has a negative association on the number of children born. 
Thus, as for H3b, the evidence does not confirm that family experiences lead to less 
support of the DI model of modernization. 
Conclusion 
  The purpose of this paper is to address our current gap in knowledge about 
important subgroup differences in beliefs in developmental idealism. More specifically, it 
focuses on how different subpopulations believe in the causal connections of 
modernization and family change. That is, to what extent do different groups of people 
believe a modern family and a modern society to be associated and causally related? This 
knowledge is important because a major factor in examining people’s behaviors is 
knowing what causal models of the world they believe are true (Mitchell 2009; Thomas 




To fill this gap I rely on unique data from Nepal, a location of dramatic social 
change which has resulted in large patterns of heterogeneous access to resources. Using a 
survey of 537 people in the Chitwan valley specifically designed to measure belief in the 
developmental models, I employ confirmatory latent class analyses to group respondents 
according to their beliefs in the developmental models. Then, based on the theory that 
rejection of social norms, goals and models of living are a result of either: 1) the lack of 
means to those goals (i.e. social exclusion) or 2) a lack of knowledge of the norms, goals 
and models, I outline several important subgroups of interest for this analysis. 
In general, findings support the idea that socially isolated groups are more likely 
to reject the widely held views that modern families and modern societies are causally 
connected. For example, caste and ethnicity has a sizable relationship with belief in DI. 
The results suggest that not being a High Caste Hindu is associated with rejecting DI. 
This is not surprising since the High Caste Hindu groups have a long history of being in 
power, being the ruling elite and have the most contact with foreigners. The one 
exception to this rule is the Newar group, who have filled much the role of merchants and 
entrepreneurs, and they have had many similar opportunities as the High Caste Hindus. 
As a result, it fits that they are similar to the High Caste Hindus in terms of belief in DI 
models of modernization. On the other hand, compared to High Caste Hindus, Low Caste 
Hindus, and to an even greater extent the Terai Tibeto-Burmese, have significantly higher 
odds of rejecting at least one of the three DI developmental models. 
  To help understand this result, it is important to know that when the Chitwan 
Valley was settled just over 50 years ago, the only indigenous people were the Terai 




large increase in population, and also because of the deforestation of the jungle to create 
farmland. In addition to the substantial change in lifestyle, they also received fewer 
resources (particularly land) than the migrants from the hills (i.e. the other groups). There 
is also evidence to suggest that this group has experienced relatively fewer improvements 
in health and standard of living, and that they are substantially less likely to participate in 
development programs (Pradhan 2009). And similarly, due to the “untouchable” label 
given to the Low-caste Hindus they have similarly lacked access to most resources, thus 
making it difficult to for them to leave their socially isolated positions in society (Bista 
1972; Hofer 1979). Nevertheless it should also be noted that it is impossible, with these 
data, to determine whether their experiences have led them to disbelieve in DI, or if their 
own beliefs and values have led them to avoid locations where DI would be prevalent 
(i.e. schools, government agriculture programs, women groups, owning a TV or radio, 
etc). 
Education, even if limited, is associated with believing D.I. Of course, the 
causation behind this association could run both ways. Those strongly believing in DI 
may be more inclined to go to school (or to send their children to school). As well, 
schools are also places where the messages associated with DI are taught (e.g. learning 
that delaying marriage and limiting fertility will lead to prosperity, or that with wealth 
comes more freedom and equality, etc) (Thornton 2005). Nevertheless it is clear that 
education is an important correlate of belief in Developmental Idealism in Nepal. 
Likewise, greater media use, in particular television, is associated with a greater belief in 
D.I. This is not surprising as mass media are a primary method of diffusion of ideas from 






D.I. (Barber and Axinn 2004; Thornton 2005). All of this supports the hypothesis that 
greater contact with nonfamily institutions leads to greater acceptance of the DI. 
 Thus, in summary, those groups that have been social excluded from society, even 
after controlling for access to the knowledge of the models, are more likely to reject DI. 
This may be due to their frustration with their inability to comply with DI’s goals and 
expectations due to lack of means (i.e. less access to economic, political, health and 
social resources). Or, even if people have the means, having access to the knowledge of 
DI, possibly through education or mass media, also has an important influence on 
accepting or rejecting DI.  
This study, as has been mentioned throughout this paper, is a cross-sectional 
study, and while the measures are uniquely designed to measure beliefs in developmental 
models, the data cannot determine the direction of the casual paths between the group 
characteristics and DI. Accordingly, while social exclusion and nonfamily experiences 
may lead to different beliefs, it is reasonable that these beliefs may have lead to being 
socially excluded and/or not having nonfamily experiences. To complicate matters more, 
both causal directions may be operating. Future research should address this gap by 
collecting data that allow for the examination of both causal directions, namely 








Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Measures Used in Analyses 
Measure Coding N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Social Exclusion 
Gender 0=male, 1=female 537 0.55 .50 0 1 
Ethnicity  537 
    High-caste Hindu 0=No, 1=Yes 0.47 0.50 0 1 
    Low-caste Hindu 0=No, 1=Yes 0.12 0.32 0 1 
    Newar 0=No, 1=Yes 0.06 0.23 0 1 
    Hill Tibeto-Burmese 0=No, 1=Yes 0.14 0.35 0 1 
    Terai Tibeto-
Burmese 0=No, 1=Yes 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Distance to city miles 537 7.35 6.33 0 17.6 
Nonfamily 
Experiences 
Education years 537 5.08 4.97 0 16 
Nonfamily work 537 
   Never worked for pay 0=No, 1=Yes .71 0.46 0 1 
   Worked for pay, not   
now 0=No, 1=Yes 0.16 0.37 0 1 
   Currently working for 
pay 0=No, 1=Yes 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Media exposure 
   Radio in past 12 
months 
0=never/rarely 
  1weekly/daily 537 0.35 0.48 0 1 
   Movies in past 12 
months 0-7+ 537 1.91 2.34 0 7 
  T.V. in past 12 months 0= never/rarely 1=weekly 537 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Family Experiences 
Ever Married 0=No, 1=Yes 537 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Number of Children 0-7+ 537 2.86 2.28 0 7 
Ever lived in 
polygamous marriage 0=No, 1=Yes 537 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Birth Cohort/Age 537 
    18-23 0=No, 1=Yes 0.26 0.43 0 1 
    24-32 0=No, 1=Yes 0.26 0.44 0 1 
    33-45 0=No, 1=Yes 0.24 0.43 0 1 







Table 3.2. Classification and Frequency of 8 Classes of Belief in Developmental Models 
 
 Respondent Supports Model of:   
Class 
Modern Family and Modern 
Society  Are Associated 
Family Change Causes 
Development 
Development Causes 
Family Change N Percent 
1 Yes Yes Yes 459 85.5 
2 No No No 8 1.5 
3 No No Yes 0 0 
4 No Yes Yes 11 2.0 
5 No Yes No 5 0.9 
6 Yes No No 7 1.3 
7 Yes Yes No 28 5.2 






Table 3.3: Estimated Odds Ratios of Logistics Regression Predicting Rejecting DI 
Measure   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Social Exclusion 
Female 1.08 0.66 
(0.33) (-1.57) 
Ethnicity   
    High-caste Hindu -- -- 
    Low-caste Hindu        7.35***     4.12** 
(4.10) (3.07) 
    Newar 3.59 3.68 
(1.62) (1.87) 
    Hill Tibeto-Burmese  2.00 1.31 
 (1.50) (0.67) 
    Terai Tibeto-Burmese      10.41*** 
      
5.96*** 
(6.84) (4.75) 
Distance to city      1.05** 1.02 
 (2.58) (0.81) 
Nonfamily Experiences  
Education         0.77*** 
       
0.81*** 
 (-5.81) (-3.78) 
Nonfamily work  
   Never worked for pay -- -- 
   Worked for pay, not now  1.29 0.78 
 (1.22) (-0.51) 
   Currently working for pay 2.00 1.21 
(0.71) (0.35) 
Media exposure 
   Radio in past 12 months 0.87 0.99 
(-0.61) (-0.02) 
   Movies in past 12 months 0.98 0.96 
(-0.50) (-0.58) 
  T.V. in past 12 months   0.52* 0.67 
(-2.26) (-1.29) 






Table 3.3: Estimated Odds Ratios of Logistics Regression Predicting Rejecting DI (cont) 
Measure   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Family Experiences 
Ever Married 1.54 0.84 
(0.76) (-0.35) 
Number of Children    1.19* 0.85 
 (2.03) (-1.77) 
Ever lived in polygamous 
marriage 1.60 1.22 
(1.44) (0.52) 
Birth Cohort 
    1980-1985  -- -- -- -- 
    1971-1979  1.28 1.78 0.72 1.18 
 (1.14) (-0.99) (-1.28) (0.51) 
    1958-1970  0.82 
        
0.28***   0.26* 0.79 
 (-0.44) (-3.84) (-2.28) (-0.45) 
    1940-1957    2.24*    0.45* 0.46 1.58 
(2.01) (-2.39) (-1.46) (0.92) 
Log-likelihood -183.85 -187.40 -214.93 -172.54 
LR χ2 (intercept only model)       77.34***      70.24***   15.18*  99.98*** 
Δ df 9 9 6 18 
N 537 537 537 537 
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Whose Will Dominates: Individual, Family and Community Influences on Participation 
in Spouse Selection 
 
Abstract 
This article examines child autonomy, parental power and social control as 
evidenced by the influences of individual, parental and community beliefs 
about the level of participation youth should have in selecting their spouse 
choice on later spouse choice behavior. The author develops a theoretical 
framework to explain how the individual, family and local community 
interact to determine whose desires for spouse choice behavior are 
fulfilled. This framework pays particular attention to the role of education 
as an allocator of social status. Analyses show that both the child’s and the 
father’s attitudes influence spouse choice participation. Finally, for 
children with higher levels of education or more education than their 
parents, their attitude toward spouse choice is significantly stronger than 
for those children with lower levels of education or less education than 




According to official accounts, on June 1, 2001, Nepal’s Crown Prince Dipendra 
shot and killed ten members of the royal family, including his father and mother, King 
Birendra and Queen Aishwarya (Bedi 2001; Lak 2001). The ramifications of this event 
were felt nationwide, and may have contributed to Nepal’s currently unstable political 
state. The main reason provided for this tragedy was that Dipendra and his parents 
disagreed over his choice of spouse (Ahearn 2004; Bedi and Laville 2001). It appears his 




already chosen the woman he wanted to marry. Although this is an extreme example (on 
many levels), the conflict of wills between parents and children on arranged marriage in 
Nepal has recently become more common (Ahearn 2004; Ghimire et al. 2006). It is 
indicative of the intergenerational and societal tension rising from the changing attitudes 
and values, and ambiguous (and shifting) social status that often accompanies social 
change. Indeed, the fact that arguing over an arranged versus choice marriage is accepted 
as reasonable motivation for homicide is noteworthy. More generally, the question of 
whose desires, will and requests are acknowledged and fulfilled is indicative of the 
hierarchy, social structure and values of a society (Gould 2003; Thornton 2005; 
Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). 
The relationship between the individual and society is a foundational issue within 
the social sciences. Social scholars like Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Comte and many others 
were interested in how individuals and different levels of others, like the family, church 
and community, express and enforce their will. A primary convergence point of the 
individual, family and community wills and desires is family formation behavior. Family 
formation has long lasting influences on later social, health and psychological outcomes 
for the individuals and their kin (Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn and Morgan 1987; Hoffmann 
and Su 1998; Mirowsky 1989; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007; Umberson 1989; 
Upchurch 1990). Marriage is particularly important in an impoverished country as it 
shapes many trajectories for schooling, childbearing, work, and many other later life 
course events. Who controls the initiation of a family, either through marriage, partnering 
or child bearing, is an indication of who has power, not only in that particular 




Of particular note here is how a marriage is created, or rather, who selects the 
spouse. Like endogamy is an indicator of social openness, the extent to which the 
individual has a choice in who they marry can be viewed as a sign of the society’s level 
of autonomy afforded to the individual (Kalmijn 1998; Mare 1991; Rosenfeld 2008; 
Smits 1998; Gould 2003). Thus, an important focus of sociological and demographic 
research is examining the social causes and consequences of arranged marriage, where 
youth have little or no say in their spouse choice, as well as the shift from a society based 
on arranged marriage to a society based on marriage decided by the choice of both 
partners, or what Nepalis call a “love marriage” (Ahearn 2004; Caldwell 1983; Dyson 
and Moore 1983; Ghimire et al. 2006 ; Goode 1970; Malhotra 1991; Thornton, Chang 
and Lin 1994). There is substantial evidence that in the recent past arranged marriage was 
prevalent in multiple places around the world, but that its prevalence is also declining 
rapidly (Caldwell 1982; Caldwell 1983; Dyson and Moore 1983; Ghimire et al. 2006; 
Malhotra 1991; Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994). This research also details important 
social transformations related to the decline in arranged marriage, including changes in 
education, work, media and values (Ahearn 2004; Caldwell 1983; Ghimire et al. 2006; 
Goode 1970; Smith 1973; Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994). 
Despite this research on marital arrangement, however, gaps in our understanding 
of this important process remain. For example, although youth selecting their own spouse 
may be seen as an indication of autonomy, in reality, a better measure of autonomy in 
spouse choice is the relationship between their attitude about spouse choice and their later 
spouse choice behavior (Mirowsky and Ross 2007). That is, a better indication of a 




they believe should be afforded them. Likewise, if others’ beliefs, values and wills, such 
as those of the parents or community, more accurately indicate future behavior, greater 
control has been afforded to them. Primarily this lack of attention is due to the 
extraordinary data requirements of ideational measures from the unmarried individuals, 
their parents and others followed by later marital information on their spouse selection 
process. 
This paper provides the first examination of the ideational influences on arranged 
marriage. By examining the relationship between a person’s own beliefs concerning 
arranged marriage and their later degree of choice in their spouse selection process we 
gain better understanding of their own autonomy (Barber and Axinn 2005 ; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). Also, by incorporating intergenerational and neighborhood level beliefs I 
examine the extent to which certain wills dominate others to influence the young adult’s 
family formation behavior (Barber 2001; Bengtson 1975; Coleman 1990; Heckman 
1998). There has been a greater emphasis in recent years on the importance of 
intergenerational and neighborhoods effects, but only rarely focusing on ideational 
influences (Barber 2000; Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn and Morgan 1987; McLanahan 
1988; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007; Thornton 1991; 
Wu 1996).  
This advance is feasible because of the unique data and study location used in this 
article. The data come from a large and multifaceted data collection effort aimed at 
gathering information at the individual, family and neighborhood levels between 1996 
and 2007, and thus also relies on relatively new statistical models to properly manage all 




structured around the family and the local community. In addition, Nepal is particularly 
interesting as it is currently undergoing dramatic social change, including in rates of 
arranged marriage where it was, even recently, nearly universal (Axinn and Yabiku 2001; 
Ghimire et al. 2006). Prior to examining the data I outline the theoretical framework of 
this paper with particular attention spent on ideational, intergenerational and 
neighborhood effects. In addition, I also outline the particularly important role of 
education in changing and maintaining certain values and social hierarchy. 
THEORECTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Typically scholars view an individual’s sense of personal control17, or one’s 
perception of their ability to exercise influence over their life, as a reflection of the family 
and community-level opportunities given to, and restrictions placed on, the individual 
(Mirowsky and Ross 2007). Thus, by examining society-wide sense of control we garner 
a reflected view of the society’s inequality (Bista 1994; Geis and Ross 1998; Mirowsky 
and Ross 1983; Mirowsky and Ross 1990; Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Mirowsky and Ross 
2007; Ross and Mirowsky 1992; Ross and Mirowsky 2002). It is important to note that 
this sense of self control may be related to both achieved and ascribed statuses (Bista 
1994; Mirowsky and Ross 2007). People can vary tremendously in their sense of control 
or personal autonomy: including by gender, race, education, age, marital status and 
numerous other characteristics (Mirowsky and Ross 1983; Mirowsky and Ross 1990; 
Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Mirowsky and Ross 2007; Ross and Mirowsky 1992; Ross and 
Mirowsky 2002). As well, an individual’s sense of personal autonomy has several social, 
                                                            
17 As Mirowsky and Ross (2007) explain, the concept of sense of control is similar to several other 
concepts in the social sciences, including: locus of control, self-efficacy, personal autonomy, fatalism, 





psychological and even biological effects throughout the life course (Mirowsky and Ross 
2007). By better understanding the ways in which individuals gain their sense of control, 
we have a better understanding of the complex mechanisms through which inequality, 
hierarchy and power operate in society. 
To examine the issue of personal autonomy in spouse selection I build on three 
significant social theories or frameworks. One theory emphasizes the relationship 
between beliefs and action—particularly the micro-level theory of reasoned action and 
planned behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). The second theoretical framework 
emphasizes the role of education in inducing changes in individuals’ attitudes, behavior 
and social status (Caldwell 1982; Pallas 2000; Stevens, Armstrong and Arum 2008; 
Thornton 1994; Thornton and Fricke 1987). Finally, the third component of this research 
is that I expect the two previous frameworks to work at multiple levels to influence an 
individual’s behavior. In part, I expect this to operate at multiple levels because social-
psychological research consistently reports that an individual’s sense of control, power or 
autonomy is significantly influenced by the social environment (Bird and Ross 1993; 
Krause 1987; Ross and Mirowsky 1992).  
Attitudes and Behavior 
Since the beginning of sociology, scholars have theorized about how 
communities, families and individuals interact to influence individuals’ actions. A major 
question is the extent to which society’s norms, attitudes, beliefs, and values affect 
individual behavior. Some scholars have theorized that people closer to the individual, 
like family and friends, may have unique effects. Others suggest that the local 




individual’s behavior. Even the extent to which individuals’ own ideas affect behavior, 
conditional on the local community’s ideational context, is generally unknown. However, 
despite their importance and long history in sociology, questions concerning the 
interaction of the effects of community, family and individual attitudes on behavior are 
unknown because inadequate data and incapable statistical methods have halted complete 
examination of these questions. Nevertheless, a large body of literature examines pieces 
of this larger issue and therefore provides important insights into what we can expect by 
combining all three levels of ideational influences. 
Scholarly work relating people’s beliefs to their family formation behavior covers 
fertility, contraceptive use, cohabitation, marriage, and divorce (Barber 2000; Thornton, 
Axinn and Xie 2007). One of the most widely used frameworks for linking attitudes and 
behavior at the micro level is Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action and planned 
behavior. Attitudes, defined as “disposition[s] to respond favorably or unfavorably to an 
object, person, institution, or event” (Ajzen 1988 p. 4), along with social pressures, 
predict intentions, which predict behavior. Thus, positive attitudes toward a particular 
behavior make that behavior more likely (Barber and Axinn 2005; Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975). For example, individuals with more positive attitudes toward marriage are likely 
to enter marriage earlier, and those with more positive attitudes toward cohabitation are 
more likely to enter cohabitation prior to marriage (Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). 
Following this theoretical model, an individual with greater desire for choice of their own 
spouse would try to gain greater control of the spouse selection process. It is important to 
note that although they may not get complete control, they may at least get some ability 




would expect an individual who wants to have their marriage arranged to encourage 
parents or others to organize the spouse match.  
Researchers concerned about family formation behavior also rely on 
intergenerational models (Barber 2000; Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn and Morgan 1987; 
McLanahan 1988; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007; 
Thornton 1991; Wu 1996). In particular, the idea of parental attitudes affecting children’s 
behavior has been applied to the study of parents’ influence on their children’s marriage 
behavior (Barber 2000; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). This research shows that 
parents’ desires operate in two related mechanisms: socialization and social control. 
Parents socialize their children by influencing their children’s beliefs so that they are in 
line with their own beliefs and desires about family formation. This comes not only from 
direct teaching, but also from less direct influences such as the shared environment, 
social modeling and the experiences of the parents and children (Barber 2001; Bengtson 
1975). This would suggest that parents’ desire to arrange their children’s marriage would 
influence their child’s own attitude on participation in spouse selection. However, as 
Barber (2001) shows, through social control mechanisms parents’ desires may strongly 
predict the child’s family formation behavior despite the child’s own attitudes. Social 
control uses both punishments and rewards, and is often combined with socialization 
(Coleman 1990; Heckman 1998). Therefore we might expect that parents’ attitudes to not 
only influence the child’s attitude-behavior link with arranged marriage, but that it might 
also have an independent effect. 
The intergenerational literature on marriage cited above is primarily from western 




relationship characteristics such as if the child lives with the parent or if the parent-child 
relationship is strong (Barber 2000; Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn and Morgan 1987; 
McLanahan 1988; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007; 
Thornton 1991; Wu 1996). In contrast to this work, Nepal provides an alternative context 
where parental influences and decision-making abilities are not symmetrical. That is, 
Nepal is a strongly patriarchal society where the father makes the majority of the 
decisions concerning major family-life events such as marriage (Ghimire et al 2006). 
Thus we would expect the father’s attitude to be more predictive of the level of 
participation in spouse choice than the mother’s, and possibly even more than the child’s.   
In addition to parents, other people’s desires and expectations have also been 
shown to influence individual behavior (Bernardi 2003; Harris 1995; Montgomery and 
Casterline 1996; Troyer 1997; Yabiku 2006). In past sociological theorizing, the 
neighborhood was seen as a primary unit, where common norms and shared culture were 
expected to influence behavior (Cooley 1909; McKenzie 1921). In particular, 
neighborhoods acted as both agents of socialization (Hogan and Kitagawa 1985; 
Vartanian 1999; Wilson 1987; Yabiku 2006) and as social modelers (Crane 1991; South 
and Baumer 2000; Yabiku 2006). This idea of the neighborhood as a primary unit is 
particularly powerful in Nepal where  neighborhoods are often areas of tightly packed 
homes surrounded by fields, thus strongly encouraging the constant face-to-face 
interaction required by these theories (Cooley 1909; McKenzie 1921). In fact, Yabiku 
(2006) shows that when neighbors’ ideal age of marriage is older than the single person’s 
age, that person has a much higher rate of marriage, and when neighbors believe that 




lower rates. This suggests that neighbors’ shared attitudes may influence the spouse 
selection behavior of individuals, both by socializing the individual (and parents), as well 
as independently as a normative control.    
In sum, I expect an individual’s own attitudes toward arranging their own 
marriage to have a significant influence on their participation in their later spouse 
selection. Similarly, I expect that parents may influence the attitude-behavior link of the 
child through socialization, and might also have a unique effect on the spouse choice 
participation of the child through social control. In particular, I expect the father’s 
attitude to have a stronger effect than the mother’s attitude due to the patriarchal family 
context of Nepal. Local community, or in this case, neighborhoods, are also expected to 
influence the behavior link of the child through socialization, and possibly may still have 
an independent influence on the behavioral through mechanisms of social control.  
Education and control 
Education plays an important role in the distribution of authority in people’s lives. 
I argue that one mechanism of education’s influence on an individual’s participation in 
spouse choice is through allocation of social status. Research on allocation concentrates 
on the use of education as an easy marker of knowledge, skills and personal traits for 
others in the society (Becker 1993; Pallas 2000; Schieman and Plickert 2008; Stevens, 
Armstrong and Arum 2008). Thus, regardless of the person’s real ability, the symbol of 
educational attainment is sufficient for others to imbue the person with greater authority 
and trust, which essentially gives the person greater power and personal autonomy. In the 
Western context, this imputation occurs at all levels of education, but is primarily noted 




Nepal, where educational attainment is often only a few years of schooling, even low 
levels of education are valued and may be treated with high levels of trust and status. In 
particular, education in Nepal has seen a striking expansion over the last several years—
from low levels of educational attainment, where only the wealthy and privileged were 
able to get education, to a large expansion of available schools today (Axinn and Barber 
2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001). This rapid expansion of education often leads to a large 
education gap between generations (Axinn and Barber 2001; Thornton, Chang and Lin 
1994). This lends itself particularly well to the idea of even low levels of education 
changing the social status of individuals in society and the power dynamics within 
between parents and children.  
There is strong evidence that education confers people greater control over their 
own, and reduces the influence of others (i.e. the parent or society) in decision making 
(Caldwell 1982; Kerchkhoff 1976; Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Pallas 2000; Schieman and 
Plickert 2008; Thornton and Lin 1994). That is, independent of the values, skills and 
knowledge gained from education, education changes both the child-parent relationship 
and child-society relationship by modifying the meaning of childhood and the social and 
economic value of the child (Caldwell 1982; Kerchkhoff 1976; Mirowsky and Ross 2003; 
Mirowsky and Ross 2007; Pallas 2000; Schieman 2001; Schieman and Plickert 2008). 
The literature explains that by attending school, parents lose some authority over their 
children as the direct responsibility of the child’s daily activities shifts from the family to 
the school (Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994). This affords students the ability to 
participate in normally restricted, or at least closely monitored, activities while not under 




rely on their children to supply as much labor as if they were not in school (Caldwell 
1982). In fact, the students may have additional work related to school even when they 
return home—thus further reducing their economic contribution to the family.  
Of particular note here is that the increase in status due to education may have 
ramifications for social and family hierarchy (Gould 2003). Clearly hierarchy is based on 
several ascribed characteristics such as gender, age, caste and role in the family, however, 
hierarchy can also be based on earned statuses such as employment, education and 
intelligence. In fact, it is rarely just one characteristic that determines hierarchy, thus 
making hierarchies vague and confusing—which can lead to interpersonal conflict 
(Gould 2003). Thus, while the father and mother may have authority in the home, if they 
are less educated, they may be granted less authority by the community to make decisions 
than their highly educated son. Key to this study is that education confers status, and at 
some point that status may be sufficient to modify the social hierarchy. 
Education’s role as an allocator of status implies an interaction with other effects 
of spouse choice participation. For example, at lower levels of individual education, 
parents’ access to nonfamily work, education or attitudes may strongly influence their 
children’s spouse choice behavior, independent of the child’s own desire to participate. 
However, as an individual’s education increases—thus providing more status (and more 
control) to the child, these influences may decrease and the desire of the child may 
become more influential in determining the amount of participation in the spouse 
selection process. Thus, while education is expected to have an additive effect—due to 
multiple mechanisms beyond the scope of this paper—I am particularly interested in its 




several parents who reported preferring arranged marriage for their children, but often 
provided the reasoning that if they did not let their child pick their own spouse, they were 
afraid the child would leave them. This was a possibly horrifying situation since the child 
was expected to know how to interact in the future world, a future the parents were 
certain they would be unable to survive in alone. Thus, I expect that education not only 
influences control over spouse selection, but it also changes other factors’ effects on the 
marital arrangement process. 
DATA and METHODS 
To examine the impact of individual, family, and community beliefs, behaviors 
and experiences on the amount of participation in the spouse choice process, I rely on 
several data collection projects within the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) in 
Nepal. Using individual interviews, life histories, neighborhood histories and prospective 
demographic surveillance data, I am able to examine several possible influences 
simultaneously. In the paragraphs below I detail the setting, methods of data collection 
and coding, as well as my analytic framework. 
Setting 
There are several considerations that make Nepal an especially appropriate 
location for the study of participation in spouse choice. Although not all Nepalis are 
Hindus, the country was, until recently, ruled by a Hindu king and other Hindu ruling 
elites. In part due to the extreme exploitation of the ruling elite, there was a Hinduization 
of the non-Hindu population which has had an enduring influence on many aspects of 
Nepali life (Adhikari 1998; Ghimire et al. 2006). This is important because several 




youth from participating in the spouse selection process for spiritual, pragmatic and 
social reasons (Ahearn 2004; Berreman 1972; Ghimire et al. 2006). Thus, for at least the 
last several hundred years the standard practice for families in Nepal was to have parents 
arrange the marriages of their children. Nevertheless, Ghimire and colleagues (Ghimire et 
al. 2006) show that from the mid 1970’s to the mid 1990’s arranged marriage has gone 
from being essentially universal to comprising only 2/3rds of marriages.  
 In particular, the data for this research were collected in Chitwan Valley, which 
lies in the south central part of Nepal. In 1955, the Nepalese government opened this 
valley for settlement; prior to this it was covered with dense tropical forest. Chitwan soon 
became a social melting pot, receiving migrants from all over the country. The valley has 
become connected to the rest of the country by all-weather roads, making it a business 
hub for the country. Furthermore, there has been a massive expansion of schools, health 
services, markets, bus services, cooperatives, and employment centers in Chitwan (Axinn 
& Yabiku, 2001). Previous work in Chitwan shows that there has been a sharp increase in 
school enrollment, visits to health clinics, employment outside of the home, and exposure 
to different sources of mass media and new ideas in recent birth cohorts (Axinn and 
Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Ghimire et al. 2006). 
Sample 
 In order to properly examine both ideational and nonfamily experience influences 
on behavior it is necessary to have longitudinal data, where the ideational concepts and 
nonfamily experiences are measured prior to the behavior being studied. I also need these 
measures for individuals, families and local communities. To accomplish my objectives I 




selected neighborhoods where all individuals 15-59 years old in the neighborhoods were 
interviewed concerning their values, beliefs, experiences and behaviors (Barber et al. 
1997). The 97% response rate to the 1996 study generated 5,271 individuals within the 
sample.  
The marital behavior of the 1,011 never married study participants was collected 
in regular (typically monthly) interviews between 1996 and 2007—providing 126 months 
of information. In 2006, we administered a supplemental questionnaire to the 841 young 
adults that had married in the intervening 10 years (we also interviewed those few 
couples that married during 2007). The primary focus of the instrument was to gather the 
details of the arrangement of the marriage, as well as some additional marriage related 
information. Approximately 400 of the young adults no longer lived within the study 
area, and thus we conducted the interview in their new location. The marital supplement 
was completed by 753 respondents for a response rate of 90%. However, for the purposes 
of a more uniform analytic sample, I exclude all respondents over age 25 in 1996, thus 
reducing the analytic sample to 734 respondents. 
Even though my focus is on prospective marital behavior, I also use information 
gathered from life histories to account for pre-1996 nonfamily experiences and 
institutions for the individual, the parents and neighborhood. This information was 
gathered using the life-history calendar method, which has been shown to provide 
accurate information for these types of experiences (Axinn, Pearce and Ghimire 1999; 
Freedman 1988). Also, this study uses information from the neighborhood histories, but 
particularly for 1996. Similar to the life-history calendar, the neighborhood histories 




religious locations. Finally, the English translations of the Nepali question wordings are 
noted below.  
--Table 4.1 about here-- 
Measures 
Participation in Spouse Choice 
 As mentioned earlier, marriage in Nepal has historically been arranged by the 
parents or extended family. However, the greater control of spouse selection this society 
has afforded to the youth has been on graduated levels (Ghimire et al. 2006). Therefore, I 
use a measure of the continuum of participation in spouse choice. The marital supplement 
questionnaire asked: “People marry in different ways. Sometimes our parents or relatives 
decide who we should marry, and sometimes we decide ourselves. In your case, who 
selected your husband/wife? Your parents/relatives, yourself, or both.” Those 
respondents who reported their parents or relatives decided who they could marry I code 
as 0, and those who chose their own spouse themselves I code as 4. People who 
responded “both” received the follow-up question, “Although both of you may have 
decided, one of you may have had a little more influence than the other.  Who had more 
influence in choosing your husband/wife? You, or your parents and relatives, or both 
equally?” Respondents who reported parents or relatives having greater influence I code 
as 1, those who reported having greater control themselves I code as 3 and those who 
reported having equal control with their parents and relatives I code as 2. Thus, I create a 
5 point scale from 0-4 where 0 means no control of the child in the spouse selection 
process (i.e. an arranged marriage), and 4 suggests the child had complete control of the 




 This study also relies on the prospective marital history gathered between 1996 
and 2007 as part of the household registry system. The household registry system relies 
on household reports of marriage and other family formation behaviors. This registry 
allows me to create a timing of the first marriage, which I then use to estimate a discrete-
time hazard model. By recoding the information above into arranged (code 0 from above) 
vs. some participation (codes 1-4 from above), I can estimate models of rates of entering 
an arranged marriage vs. entering a marriage with some individual spouse choice. These 
are then competing models of entering marriage. For those 88 respondents who we were 
unable to interview concerning their marriage arrangement type, I tested the model both 
by leaving them out and by treating them as a third state in the competing risk model (i.e. 
rates of entering an arranged marriage vs. an individual-choice marriage vs. a marriage 
that we don’t know how it was arranged). The results suggest that the characteristics of 
this group of missing respondents are unrelated to our variables of interest. 
Attitudes 
 In order to capture the influence of beliefs and norms on spouse choice selection I 
rely on a question asked of all individuals in the 1996 interview. Specifically this 
question asks, “Next I would like to ask a little more about your attitudes toward family 
life. I will read some statements to you.  Please listen to them carefully and tell me 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statements. 
Parents should always choose a spouse for their child.” I code the responses as 
0=Strongly Agree, 1=Agree, 2=Disagree, 3=Strongly Disagree. I interpret a low score of 
this attitude as preferring parental arranged marriage, and a high score as evidence of a 




relies on the assumption that when respondents disagreed that the parents should arrange 
the marriage, they were implying that the child should have some control, and not that 
other people, like extended family, the government, etc, should have more control. Based 
on my own experience in Nepal, this assumption is reasonable. Among our marital 
supplement study participants, the average score on the 0-3 measure was 1.3, or less than 
halfway along the continuum.  
 To obtain a measure of the parents’ and neighbors’ ideational influences on 
spouse choice I also use the 1996 interview question described above, but asked of them. 
Approximately 158 of the fathers, and 86 of the mothers did not provide attitudinal 
information. To account for this loss of information I impute the parents’ attitude using 
standard imputation methods (Little and Rubin 2002)18. The average attitude of the 
parents on the 0-3 scale is 1.2 for fathers and 1.0 for mothers, or just slightly lower than 
their children. I also use the same attitude question and coding for the neighborhood 
measure. That is, I average all the neighbor’s attitudes to create a “generalized other” 
attitude. The average for the 151 neighborhoods was also 1.2. The range of scores was 
small—from 0.62 to 1.69, and thus a standard one unit increase in this variable would 
equal the entire range of variation. To compensate for this in the model I report the effect 
as a change in 0.1 units (or equivalently, I multiplied the variable by 10 so the range went 
from 6.2 to 16.9 with a one unit increase). 
 All of these attitudes are measured prior to the spouse selection behavior. This 
fact strengthens the causal interpretation of the effects as long as marriage arrangements 
were not made prior to the survey question. Nepali marital arrangements, are typically 
not from birth, and marriages are often completed within a year of the arrangement 
                                                            




(Ghimire et al 2006). For this reason, we might expect the few marriages occurring 
during the first year of the study to be more prone to endogeneity bias, but after the first 
year the bias is essentially nonexistent. Even after excluding all marriages that occurred 
in the first year of the study, the results remain as indicated below. 
Controls 
 In any study such as this there are several important factors that are not the focus 
of the study, but are necessary to correctly understand the context of the study. For this 
paper I include several important controls, but I do not report the effects in the tables of 
results. Below I briefly discuss the roles of all of the controls in this research. 
The relationship between age and arranged marriage is well-documented 
(Ghimire et al. 2006). Those who have marriages primarily arranged by their parents also 
tend to marry at much younger ages, and those who choose their own spouse are typically 
much older. In part, this is a result of the fact that by delaying marriage individuals are 
expected to have more nonfamily experiences. This is particularly true if the delay is due 
to educational goals or nonfamily work necessities. Therefore it is reasonable that 
although I start at a fairly young age for marriage of 15, I may have already missed 
people who were already married by the 1996 interview. As well, age often has a 
nonlinear relationship to marriage in general, with sharp increases seen at earlier ages, 
and decreases in rates of marriage at older ages; this creating an inverted U relationship 
(Yabiku 2006). Thus, I use the age at the time of risk of marriage as an important control 
when predicting participation in spouse choice. In addition I use the time varying age and 
its square in the hazard model to account for the nonlinear relationship. The average age 




Gender differences for many social, health and demographic outcomes exist in 
Nepal (Ahearn 2004; Bennett; Macfarlane 1986). Compared to men women are typically 
seen as having lower status (Caldwell 1983; Dyson and Moore 1983; Ghimire et al. 
2006). In relation to marriage, women are typically younger than their husband, and often 
have less control over the spouse selection (Ghimire et al. 2006; Yabiku). Thus I also 
expect that women will have less control over their own spouse choice, and will enter 
marriage, and particularly arranged marriage at much faster rates than men.  
Caste/Ethnicity is an important control variable for this study because certain 
castes, particularly Hindus, prefer to have their family play a large role in finding or 
deciding on a spouse. Although caste is extremely complex, a common classification is 
into five major groups: high-caste Hindu, low-caste Hindu, Newar, Hill Tibeto-Burmese, 
and Terai Tibeto-Burmese (Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Ghimire et al. 2006). The first two 
groups both have similarly origins from India, and both practice the Hindu religion, but 
the former has had much greater access to political, economic and social resources. 
Newars are unique in that they practice elements of both Buddhism and Hinduism. 
Despite being native to the Kathmandu valley, due to their extensive involvement in the 
business sector of Nepal, they can be found all over Nepal. The Hill Tibeto-Burmese 
group is primarily from Tibet and primarily practice Buddhism. Finally, the Terai Tibeto-
Burmese groups are the native inhabitants of the Chitwan Valley. Despite the strong 
Hinduization of the non-Hindu groups which has influenced almost every ethnic group to 
arrange their marriages to some extent, (Ahearn 2004; Berreman 1972; Ghimire et al. 
2006), ethnic groups still differ widely in their forms of arranging marriage, with the two 




and then the two Tibeto-Burmese groups (Ahearn 2004; Bennett 1983; Fricke 1986; 
Ghimire et al. 2006; Macfarlane 1986). 
I also control for 6 types of nonfamily experience that have been shown to be 
particularly important for arranged marriage: education, nonfamily work, media 
exposure, participation in youth clubs, travel and residential moves (Ghimire et al. 2006; 
Thornton, Chang and Lin 1994). I also include a neighborhood measure of the distance to 
the nearest school. Below I briefly describe how each measure was constructed. 
Educational experiences have been a major focus of the CVFS. Using the 1996 
interview I create two measures of education for the main, or focal, sample of never 
married youth. One measure is the total accumulation of education, in years, until 1996. 
The second measure is if the respondent was enrolled in school in 1996. Including both is 
typically important as they often have opposite effects on timing of marriage (Raymo 
2003; Thornton, Axinn and Teachman 1995; Yabiku 2006). The mean number of years of 
school of the main sample was 7.3 years and 63% were enrolled at the time of the 
interview.  
Measures of parent and neighborhood education also use the 1996 interview data. 
However, in the few cases where either the father or mother did not supply an educational 
attainment measure; I use the child’s report of the parent’s education level. Among the 
parents of the focal sample of unmarried children, fathers had attended school for an 
average of 3.6 years while mothers had attended an average of only 0.7 years of school. 
Nonfamily work is also an important measure of nonfamily experiences. For all 
individuals including children and both parents, I use the life history calendar to 




positions) by 1996. For those parents who did not have a work experience history, I rely 
on the child’s report of if the parent had ever worked for pay. Looking at Table 4.1 we 
see that 59% of the unmarried children, 53% of fathers, and 27% of mothers had ever had 
a nonfamily work experience. 
Mass media, including radio, television and movies, in Nepal generally present 
Western values and views, and typically have been shown to encourage the reduction of 
social control (Axinn and Barber 2001; Janowitz 1981). Ghimire and colleagues (Ghimire 
et al. 2006) found that for past generations, any exposure to mass media was associated 
with greater participation in the spouse selection process. To control for the media 
exposure of individuals this study uses three questions about the extent to which people 
listen to the radio, watch T.V. and attend movies. Few in this study had never seen at 
least one of these three media forms, and the amount of consumption for the three types 
is highly correlated. Therefore I create an index by combining the three types of media 
consumption, where 0=never or rarely consume the media, 1=refers to low levels of 
consumption such as once a week for the radio, once a month for T.V. and fewer than 4 
movies a year, and 2=is higher levels of media consumption. Combining all three 
variables gives a range of 0-6, with a mean of 4.2. 
 Participation in youth clubs has increased tremendously over the past several 
years, and research shows they provide an important venue for youth to exchange ideas, 
as well as facilitating finding romantic partners (Ghimire et al. 2006). The measure of 
youth club participation comes from the question on the life history calendar, “Have you 




response was coded as 0. By 1996, 17% of the focal sample had ever participated in a 
youth club.  
 Travel can provide several opportunities to see new behaviors and learn new 
ideas. In particular, traveling to a major city (i.e. Kathmandu), or abroad may be a 
particularly powerful experience. Based on the interviews I create two dichotomous 
measures: 1) if they ever traveled to Kathmandu and 2) if the respondent had ever 
traveled out of Nepal. In 1996, 30% of the respondents had traveled to Kathmandu and 
10% of the focal sample had traveled out of Nepal.  
 Residential moves may also introduce people to new ideas and enlarge their social 
networks. Although most likely a decision of the parents (or other family member), 
children have been shown to be strongly influenced by the number of residential moves. 
In particular, Ghimire and colleagues (Ghimire et al. 2006) find that those who moved 
more frequently in their premarital life, had greater control over their spouse selection. 
Using the life history calendar, I can estimate the number of moves based on the changes 
in residential location. Prior to 1996, half of the focal sample had never moved (giving 
even more strength to the influence of the neighborhood), another 25% had only moved 
once, and typically the rest only move 1 or 2 additional times. 
The number of children a respondent’s mother has may be a measure of resource 
competition within the household. To account for this I control for the number children 
the mother had by 1996. Also as discussed above, I control for those respondents who 
were not living in the same neighborhood as their parents in 1996. About 10% of the 
focal sample was in this group. This variable has the important methodological role of 




non-family living. Like other nonfamily experiences, this measure may influence spouse 
choice, and thus it is an important methodological and substantive control (Thornton and 
Lin 1994). 
Analytic Framework 
 In order to examine the multiple influences of spouse choice participation 
simultaneously, my analysis consists of two components. The first uses ordinal logistic 
regression to examine spouse choice participation. As part of that analysis I interact the 
entire model by education to test my hypothesis that education changes the influence of 
other variables. The second portion of the analyses is a variation of the participation 
model which models the hazard of having an arranged marriage as a competing risk to 
having a marriage with some spouse choice given to the child. For reasons I detail below, 
I also run each model separately by gender and caste. What follows is a description of 
each of these steps. 
Participation in Spouse Choice 
In order to estimate multivariate models of the five point ordinal measure of 
participation in spouse choice, I use ordinal logistic regression (Hoffmann 2004; Powers 
and Xie 2000). This technique uses the cumulative logit function to estimate the 
relationship between the ordinal dependent variable and the collection of independent 
variables. This approach is particularly useful because the underlying assumption of the 
statistical model is that the ordinal measure represents a continuous underlying function. 
Because the data are hierarchical, I use Mplus’ multilevel option to account for the 
clustering at the neighborhood level (Muthén and Muthén 2006). Because of the scarce 




The multilevel ordinal logistic regression estimates of the odds ratios predicting 
increasing control of the individual in the spouse choice are presented in Table 4. 2. My 
general interpretation for these coefficients is that for each unit increase in the 
independent variable there is a multiplicative increase in the odds of moving to the next 
highest category in the ordinal scale of individual (i.e. child) control of the spouse choice 
process. Presented coefficients greater than 1 indicate a positive relationship between the 
independent variable and spouse choice participation, and coefficients less than 1 indicate 
a negative relationship. Finally, although not shown here, I also tested these models in a 
multilevel multinomial logistic regression to examine the proportional odds assumption 
of the ordinal logistic regression model (Powers and Xie 2000). I find that for the most 
part the categories do appear ordinal in nature, and therefore do not need to be treated as 
nominal categories. 
 To examine the influence of education as a method of allocation, I interact the 
ordered logistic regression model with two education categories based on the 
respondent’s education attainment in 1996. For the first education grouping, I divided the 
sample into those with 8 years or greater of education, and those with fewer than 8 years 
of education. I have two reasons for this cut point. First, the median level of education for 
this sample is 8 years of school. Thus the groups are of equal size, which provides 
maximum statistical efficiency. More importantly, however, is that I originally chose the 
8 year cutoff because that is the grade level everyone should have obtained by age 15. 
Thus, if they had gone to school according to standard schooling practices (and even if 
they started late or were held back) they should have completed the 8th grade by age 15, 




(above vs. below 8 years of school), and point out significant differences between the 
two. 
 The second categorization of education I use for an interaction is if children had 
more schooling in 1996 than their parents, or if they had the same or less education. I 
used the child’s educational attainment in 1996 and whichever of the parent’s education 
was higher (usually the father). This measure focuses the issue of education’s role of 
providing status. Thus, if the child has higher education levels than the parents, then they 
may have more status and even more autonomy. Although I did try a measure of the 
number of years more education a child had, because the results are so similar, I went 
with the more parsimonious measure of education. Again, I present the same model for 
each of the two groups, and point out significant differences between the two. 
Hazard of Arranged Marriage  
 I also estimate the effects of individual, family and neighborhood beliefs and 
nonfamily experiences on the rate of marriage using discrete-time hazard models. These 
models take the full unmarried sample and follow them for 126 months to estimate the 
timing of marriage (Hoffmann 2004; Powers and Xie 2000). Specifically, I am using a 
competing-risks hazard model, and focus on the effects of the independent variables on 
the rate of entering an arranged marriage vs. the rate of entering a choice marriage (i.e. 
any amount of choice). In this model, person-months of exposure become the unit of 
analysis, and although the number of person-months is extremely large this does not 
inflate the standard errors (Allison 1982). I use logistic regression to estimate the effects 
of the independent variables on rate of marriage. Again, I present the results as 




are so narrow, I interpret the estimates as changes in the rate of marriage, as is standard in 
the literature (Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). Following the example of Yabiku (Yabiku 
2006) I control for the seasonality of marriage by giving each of the 12 months its own 
dummy variable (i.e. 11 dummy variables and one comparison month), but these effect 
estimates are not presented in the results. I also tested for several other parameterizations, 
including a full parameterization of 125 dummy variables for all 126 months of 
observation. None of the parameterizations of the baseline hazard influenced the results, 
and thus I used the more parsimonious 12 month parameterization. I also present a model 
that explicitly compares the effects of the different independent variables on arranged 
marriage compared to their effects on choice marriage. Finally, I also run all the 
education, gender and caste interactions but do not present those results in this paper, 
other than to note any important findings. 
RESULTS 
--Table 4.2 about here-- 
 Before presenting the results in Table 4.2, it is useful to examine the amount of 
spouse choice over the last 10 years for this sample. As mentioned earlier, of the 1,011 
never married respondents in 1996, 843 (83%) were married after 10 years. Of those, we 
were able to interview 75319 respondents. Of these respondents, 28.4% reportedly had no 
control over their spouse choice, 13.4% reported having some control, but that their 
parents had more, 12.0% were recorded as saying that they and their parents’ shared 
equally in the spouse selection process, an additional 15.0% said both they and their 
parents had say in the process, but that they had more of the control, and finally 31.2% 
                                                            





reported choosing their spouse by themselves. When combined with the retrospective 
work of Ghimire and colleagues (Ghimire et al. 2006) the results confirm a dramatic 
change in marriage in Nepal. In their study of ever married people ages 25-54 in 1996, 
65% reported no control over the marriage arrangement and 22% chose their spouse for 
themselves (the other percentages in order of increasing children participation were 6%, 
2% and 5%). This is evidence of a fast shift from a society of almost no child 
participation in spouse choice, to one where most people have the majority of the control 
over their own spouse selection, to possibly one soon that will see few parents having the 
majority of the control of choosing a spouse.  
Participation in Spouse Choice 
I present the results of the multilevel ordinal logistic regression in Table 4.2. Also, 
although not shown in Table 4.2, I will refer to models where the effects were run alone 
or in groups to test their mediating effects on other relationships. In addition, all models 
control for age at marriage, gender, caste, child and parent educational attainment, 
distance from neighborhood to closest school, if respondent was enrolled in school in 
1996, media exposure, if respondent ever traveled to Kathmandu, if respondent ever 
traveled outside of Nepal, number of residential moves in respondents lifetime and the 
number of children the respondent’s mother has (i.e. number of  siblings still living); but 
these results are not presented in the tables, nor are they extensively discussed. Generally, 
the effects of these controls did not differ from past research findings (Ahearn 2004; 





Model 1 presents the estimate for the effect of the child’s attitude that youth 
should have more say in their spouse selection on their the child’s own spouse selection 
process, conditional on the controls mentioned above. In line with my hypothesis, model 
1 shows that the more a individual believes youth should have more control of their 
spouse choice the greater the control they receive in their own spouse choice (Fishbein 
and Ajzen 1975; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). However, despite the nontrivial size of 
the estimate, statistically, the effect is non-significant. The addition of parental and the 
neighborhood average attitudes in model four changes the size of this effect (or it 
significance) little. Thus, although the effect is in the expected direction, the evidence is 
lacking that the individual’s own attitude predicts their spouse choice participation.    
Model 2 of Table 4.2 presents the estimated joint effects of the parents’ belief that 
children should have more control over their spouse choice, while controlling for several 
other factors. Recall that the hypothesis is that parents who believe that children should 
have more choice in their marriage partner selection will have children with more 
involvement in the process (Barber 2000; Barber and Axinn 2005 ; Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975; Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). Jointly, parent’s attitudes do predict spouse choice 
participation, although only marginally significant. More interesting is that the effect of 
the father’s belief is larger and in the hypothesized direction, compared to the mother’s 
attitude. More specifically, as father’s belief that children should have more say in the 
spouse choice increases by one level, there are ((1.17-1)*100) 16% higher odds the child 
will move to the next highest level of participation. This effect implies that the father’s 
belief is at least as important, if not more important, than the child’s own value in 




of the father’s belief is in line with the hypothesis that parents play an important role in 
determining the child’s level of participation and that within the patriarchal context of 
Nepal father’s attitudes are typically more influential than mother’s view. The inclusion 
of the child’s and the neighborhood attitudes inconsequentially change the effects for 
both parents. 
Model 3 is the test of the neighborhood average attitude on the child’s spouse 
choice. Both the coefficient in Model 3 and the full model in the final column point to 
community having little to no effect on participation in spouse choice. Of course, 
important here is to note that the effect is really the attitude of the members of the 
neighborhood in 1996. That is, while all of the measures of attitudes suffer from possible 
changes within individuals (i.e. the father becomes more accepting of child participation 
which leads to more child participation), the neighborhood suffers the additional problem 
that people move in and out. Therefore, even if these attitudes were fixed across time and 
within individual, a neighborhood could change substantially due to migration of people 
with different beleifs. Thus, it may be that neighborhood effects are more difficult to 
detect, due to this possibly constant change. Similarly, the average attitude of the 
neighborhood may not be the “generalized other” most people are influenced by. That is, 
a better measure may include different age groups, peer networks or gender.  
Models by Gender and Caste As discussed earlier, both gender and caste are extremely 
influential in determining the level of participation in spouse choice. As expected, being 
female is the largest (negative) indicator of participation in spouse selection (Ahearn 
2004; Bennett; Caldwell 1983; Dyson and Moore 1983; Ghimire et al. 2006; Macfarlane 




suggest this is still the case in Nepal. Young women typically have 78-80% lower odds of 
participating in next higher category of spouse choice than men. The results of all four 
models show that caste is strongly related to spouse choice participation, paralleling past 
research (Ahearn 2004; Bennett 1983; Berreman 1972; Fricke 1986; Ghimire et al. 2006; 
Macfarlane 1986). Generally we see that Low-caste Hindus do not have significantly 
different spouse selection involvement from High-caste Hindus. Newar youth appear to 
be about 2 times more likely to be in a higher category of spouse choice participation 
than High-caste Hindus. And both Tibeto-Burmese groups are 3.4 to 4.6 more likely to 
participate in the next highest level of spouse choice involvement. Altogether this 
suggests that caste still plays a strong role in marital arrangement, and in fact, because the 
effect sizes appear to be larger than previous work, it may be evidence the Hinduization 
of non-Hindu’s is declining (Ghimire et al. 2006). This may suggest that soon arranged 
marriage may only found within the Hindu caste groups. 
In order to consider the different cultural milieus for people of different castes and 
the different processes for young men and you women, I run model 4 allowing for 
interactions by gender and then by caste (results not shown). Although most variables 
appeared to operate in similar directions and magnitudes for both men and women, some 
important distinctions are evident. First, the moderate positive effect of the child’s 
attitude appears to be the result of combining the essentially no effect for males (odds 
ratio of 0.99) and the significant positive effect for females (odds ratio of 1.28). This 
result indicates that the child’s attitude matters more for women than for men (an 
unexpected result). Of course it is also important to keep in mind that while 44% of boys 




had their marriage arranged 41% of girls had no say in choosing their marriage partner. 
Hence if arranged marriage is primarily for girls, an attitude effect would be much easier 
to detect than it would for boys. 
 Another interesting finding is that, for males, both parents’ attitudes are relatively 
large, positive and significant. That is, for boys, both the mother’s and the father’s 
attitudes toward giving more control to the child increase that child’s participation in 
their spouse choice selection (odds ratio of about 1.25 for both). Because of the lack of 
the effect from the boy’s own attitude, this implies a stronger social control mechanism 
over socialization (Barber 2000). However, for girls, the effect of the father’s attitude 
similar to that for boys, but the mother’s attitude has a very strong negative effect (odds 
ratio of 0.73). The large negative effect may be evidence of a statistical anomaly due to 
the moderate correlation of 0.325 with father’s attitude. However, further exploration 
suggests that this effect is negative and significant even after removing other ideational 
measures. One possible explanation is that in the case where the mother is pushing for 
greater control over the spouse choice process for her daughter, the father may in fact put 
greater limitations on the young woman’s role. However, this is purely speculative and 
would require greater field world to flesh out this issue. 
 The models of spouse participation do fit slightly better for the Hindu groups 
(both High-caste and Low-caste) compared to the non-Hindu groups. That is, the person’s 
own attitude toward greater child participation in spouse choice has a stronger (and 
significant) effect on actual participation. However, the differences in most of these 
effects are not statistically significant (in part due to the smaller sample sizes of the non-




control afforded to the children in their spouse selection, the ideational effects do not 
appear to be significantly different across caste.  
Interaction with Education 
--Table 4.3 about here-- 
Table 4.3 reports the test of the interaction of two categorizations of education 
with the ordered logistic model in Table 4. 2 (model 4). These tests are intended to reflect 
the hypothesis that education allocates status, trust and autonomy, so that parents and 
others view the individual differently. That is, under different levels of education we 
would expect different effects from multiple variables.  
An examination of the results suggests this hypothesis is supported. Those youth 
with 8 years or higher education in 1996 have substantially higher levels of control over 
their spouse choice, and those with lower levels of education are more influenced by the 
experiences and characteristics of others. The best example of this is the change in the 
coefficient for the child’s own attitude toward spouse choice. Recall that in the previous 
model there was a positive relationship between the attitude and behavior that was 
interpreted as an indication of some level of control over spouse selection for at least 
some of the children. The interaction with education shows that this small positive effect 
is a result of the strong positive effect of the attitude for the individuals with higher levels 
of education (odds ratio of 1.43), while those with less than 8 years have little control as 
the odds ratio of 0.97 is not significantly different from 1. That is, the effect of the 
attitude for those above 8 years of education is a 43% increase in the odds of moving in 
to the next highest participation category for each one unit increase in disagreeing that 




years there is essentially no effect of the individual’s attitude on later participation in 
spouse selection.  
This result is confirmed in the third and fourth columns when comparing 
significant difference in the effects of the child’s attitude for children with the same or 
fewer years of school than their parents (a nonsignificant odds ratio of 0.94) and those 
having more education than their parents (odd ratio of 1.27). One reason for the slightly 
smaller effect in this education interaction is that while few of the children with less than 
8 years of education probably ever obtained enough additional education to move into the 
8+ years of education group, several of the children could have moved from the less than 
or equal to group to the kids having more than their parents group between the survey 
date and the marriage date.  Nevertheless, overall, this supports the hypothesis that 
education provides an avenue for youth to express their will, possibly due to the higher 
social status they obtain by completing more education (Caldwell 1982; Gould 2003). 
The interaction with education produces interesting effects in the other ideational 
measures as well. Regardless of having more or less than 8 years of school, the father’s 
attitude has a similar effect for those with less than 8 years of school and for those with 
more than 8 years. And although the difference between the effects is somewhat larger in 
the interaction with the child-parent education comparison (i.e. columns 3 and 4) the 
effects are not significantly different. However, for the effect of the mother’s attitude on 
child participation in spouse choice there does appear to be a significant change in effect 
size. That is, for those with less than 8 years of school the effect of the mother’s attitude 
is negative (i.e. odds ratio of 0.79) which is significantly different from the effect of 




interesting in that for children with higher education the individual and both parental 
attitudes are all in the expected positive direction, whereas for those children with lower 
levels of education the effects are more difficult to understand.  
Models by Gender and Caste To conclude the discussion of the spouse choice 
participation model I briefly discuss the differences in these regressions by gender and 
caste. To be clear, at this point these models are three-way interaction models, and are 
difficult to interpret in part because it is difficult to know how to compare across the four 
groups (i.e. male-lower than 8 years, male-higher than 8 years, female-lower than 8 years 
and female higher than 8 years). Nevertheless, the general pattern holds that among lower 
educated people (or people with less education than their parents)—whether male or 
female, or of most any caste—their parent’s attitudes have stronger effects and their own 
attitudes have weaker effects when compared to those effects of people with higher levels 
of education (or more education than their parents). In other words, education’s ability to 
provide greater control of the spouse choice to the child (as indicated by a significant 
attitude effect for the child) appears to work for both males and females and works 
similarly for most castes.   
--Table 4.4 about here-- 
Competing-risk hazard models of arranged and some choice marriage  
 I present the results of the competing risk hazard model in Table 4.4. The first 
column of results represents the odds of entering a marriage where the spouse was 
selected solely by the parents (i.e. an arranged marriage). The second column of results 
represents the odds of entering a marriage where the child had some involvement in 




of entering the other (and of being in the married but did not respond group). The third 
column supplies the effect size difference comparing arranged marriage to choice 
marriage. Thus while the first two columns examine the rate of entering a certain type of 
marriage, controlling for the option of entering another type of marriage, the third column 
explicitly compares those two types of marriages. Thus, a significant effect larger than 1 
reports that the characteristic promotes choice marriage over arranged marriage, and a 
significant effect below 1 asserts that the characteristic discourages choice marriage over 
an arranged marriage. Recall that the purpose of this model is to control for the censoring 
of people who never married. It also provides a secondary examination of the results 
from the ordinal logistic regression and the education interaction. Finally, because the 
monthly time period is so narrow and events are rare, the odds of experiencing the event 
approximate the continuous-time rate of experiencing the event (Thornton, Axinn and 
Xie 2007; Yabiku 2005). Therefore, in this situation, I use the terms odds and rates 
interchangeably in my discussion of the results. 
 Because many of the results here parallel the findings of Tables 4.2 and 4.3, I will 
only emphasize the important substantive findings. For example, we can see that the 
stronger a person’s own belief that parents should not choose their child’s spouse, the 
slower their rate of entry into any marriage, and particularly into arranged marriage. 
More specifically for every increase in disagreeing that parents should choose their 
children’s spouse there is a 29% decrease in the rate of entering an arranged marriage, 
and a 7% decrease in the rate of entering a choice marriage. Although the effect is only 
significant for arranged marriage, the third column indicates that having a more positive 




an arranged marriage over a choice marriage. Thus, even if children do not get the full 
participation they want, their attitude may delay the arranged marriage substantially.  
 Parental attitudes are consistent with the intergenerational transmission literature 
that suggests that even after controlling for the child’s own attitude, parent’s attitude has 
significant influences on family formation (Axinn, Clarkberg and Thornton 1994; 
Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007). More specifically, increasing the father’s attitude toward 
greater child participation in spouse choice increases rates of entering a choice marriage 
and promotes entering a choice marriage over an arranged marriage. Again this unique 
effect of father’s attitude implies that parent’s influence operates through social control 
mechanisms in addition to any socialization mechanisms—and that the patriarchal family 
system of Nepal is still relative in family formation decisions. Also note that in this case 
the effect of mother’s attitude is never significantly different than 1, but does still appear 
to discourage choice marriage over arranged marriage. 
 The effects of the controls (not shown) are also worth quickly mentioning. Age 
operates under the well-established inverted U shape (Yabiku 2006; Yabiku 2005). 
However, arranged marriage does seem to have a more compressed inverted U. Women 
are entering choice marriage at 33% faster rates than men, which is consistent with 
previous work (Ghimire et al. 2006; Yabiku 2006). However, more impressive is that 
women enter arranged marriage at 6.1 times faster rates than men. This effect has actually 
increased from the past generation, and suggests that for some women in Nepal there is 
still a great lack of control in one of the defining events of their lives. As well, caste 
appears to have strong effects for entering an arranged marriage, with the Hindu castes 




there is evidence that caste is less an issue with choice marriage timing. That is, many of 
the difference seen in arranged marriage are not evident in the hazard of entering a choice 
marriage. In sum, the results of the controls imply that arranged marriage is now 
primarily an issue for females within the Hindu castes. 
Finally, I ran each of the competing risks models for both sets of education groups 
(more/less than 8 years and more/less than parents). These interactions reaffirmed the 
overall findings of this study. For example, although the child’s own attitude toward 
greater participation in spouse choice lowers rates of entering both the arranged and 
choice marriage, it was only in the higher education groups (i.e. 8 or more years of 
school, or children with more education than their parents) that the effect the attitude had 
significantly stronger effect on delaying arranged marriage compared to choice 
marriage20.  
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore a central focus of social science research; 
namely the influence of parents and neighborhood context on a person’s sense of control, 
or autonomy. As a manifestation of autonomy I examine the extent to which people 
participate in the selection of their spouse. More specifically, I operationalize autonomy 
as the relationship between a person’s attitude toward spouse choice and their later 
spouse choice participation. That is, greater autonomy would be related to stronger 
relationships between the attitude and later participation. I test the extent to which the 
individual, parents and neighbors influence participation in spouse choice and the rate at 
which people enter arranged versus choice marriages. 
                                                            
20 I also extended these models to include interactions with caste and gender, but no new or important 




Historically in Nepal, arranged marriage was almost universal. However, recent 
social changes have seen that practice quickly and consistently decline (Ghimire et al. 
2006). I document the continued decline of arranged marriages over the past 10 years in 
Nepal. For the first time in hundreds (if not thousands) of years, more people are 
probably choosing their spouse completely by themselves than having their parents 
choose one for them. Only about 28% of the sample still had their marriages arranged, 
down from 65% of the previous generation. However, I also document that certain 
historical relationships still remain. For example, Hindu castes (both Upper and Lower 
Hindus) are still the primary participants of arranged marriage. This is not surprising 
since it was the Hinduization of the other groups that lead to the near universal practice of 
arranging marriage. Also, there is strong evidence that the bulk of the decline of arranged 
marriage is among males. That is, women often have 5-6 times higher odds of being in an 
arranged marriage than their male counterparts.  
 An important finding of this study is that there are strong ideational influences on 
spouse choice. For example, there is a positive effect of preferring more child 
participation in spouse choice and then getting to participate in one’s own spouse 
selection process. Interestingly, it is important to note that one possible cause for 
women’s lower level of participation is that they report lower levels of thinking children 
should participate in spouse selection. I judge the significant positive relationship 
between attitude and behavior to be a sign of some autonomy given to these youth in the 
marriage process. More importantly, this paper shows that children with higher levels of 
education (8 years and over) and those with higher levels of education than their parents 






higher levels of education. This finding confirms the hypothesis that allocation of status 
and autonomy by education is changing the effects of other variables, and not just acting 
as a mediating factor. As well, for those who have higher levels of education there is 
evidence that both parental attitudes toward child participation in the spouse choice 
process positively influence the child’s spouse selection. However, among less educated 
youth, it is only the father’s attitude that influences the participation of the child. That is, 
for children with lower levels of education the patriarchal context of Nepal affords the 
father the authority to determine the amount of participation the child has in his or her 
own spouse choice.  
As noted earlier, this study attempts to find influences on autonomy by using the 
instrument of arranged marriage. It has shown a strong effect of the allocation of status 
through education. However, this study was not able to fully examine the socialization 
effects of education, although there is some evidence of the effect of socialization. A 
better study of this would examine the role of nonfamily experience in changing values or 
abilities. Also, more work needs to be done on women’s experience with spouse choice. 
Based on these results, unless there is dramatic social change, Nepal will soon be a place 
where only Hindu women have arranged marriage, and they will have few mechanisms 




Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Measures Used in Analyses 
 
Measure   Coding N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Participation in spouse selection 0=low - 4=high 734 2.07 1.63 0 4 
Independent Variables 
Attitude-Parents should always choose spouse 
   Child’s attitude 0=SA - 3=SD 734 1.29 0.88 0 3 
   Father’s attitude 0=SA - 3=SD 576 1.18 0.91 0 3 
   Mother’s attitude  0=SA - 3=SD 648 0.98 0.90 0 3 
   Neighborhood average attitude 0=SA - 3=SD 734 1.205 0.23 0.62 1.69 
Controls 
Respondent Age at Marriage Age in years 734 22.54 3.65 15 35 
Gender 
0=male, 
1=female 734 0.52 0.5 0 1 
Ethnicity 734 
  High-caste Hindu 0=No, 1=Yes 0.54 0.5 0 1 
  Low-caste Hindu 0=No, 1=Yes 0.08 0.27 0 1 
  Newar 0=No, 1=Yes 0.07 0.26 0 1 
  Hill Tibeto-Burmese 0=No, 1=Yes 0.13 0.33 0 1 
  Terai Tibeto-Burmese 0=No, 1=Yes 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 Child’s Educational attainment Total years 734 7.26 3.06 0 14 
 Father’s educational attainment Total years 720 3.62 4.18 0 1 
 Mother’s  educational attainment Total years 730 0.67 1.82 0 1 
 Distance walk to nearest school in minutes 734 9.2 6.55 0 30 
 Child enrolled in school in 1996 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Child ever worked for 
pay 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Child’s media exposure 0=low - 6=high 734 4.2 1.14 0 6 
Child ever participated in youth 
clubs 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Child ever traveled to Kathmandu 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Child ever traveled outside Nepal 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Number of residential moves for 
Child 0 - 3+ 734 0.81 0.97 0 3 
Father ever worked for 
pay 0=No, 1=Yes 734 0.53 0.5 0 1 
Mother ever worked for 
pay 0=No, 1=Yes 733 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Mother’s number of 






Table 4.2. Ordinal Logistic Regression Estimates of the Influence of Individual, 












should participate in 
spouse choice 
 
   Child’s attitude 
 
1.11  1.13 
 (1.29)  (1.44) 
   Father’s attitude    1.16 + 1.17 + 
   (1.72) (1.79) 
   Mother’s attitude    0.92 0.94 
   (-1.00) (-0.79) 
 Neighborhood average 
attitude (0.1 unit 
increase) 
 
  0.97 0.96 
   (-0.85) (-1.19) 
   
N  734 734 734 734 
df  21 22 21 24 
-2 log likelihood  2097.69 2095.47 2098.58 2092.62 
Z-values in parenthesis + p<0.10, *p-value<0.05, **p-value<0.01, ***p-value<0.001 (two-
tailed tests) 
All analyses control for respondent age at marriage, gender, caste, child and parental educational 
attainment in 1996, neighborhood distance to closest school, 1996 school enrollment, media 





Table 4.3. Ordinal Logistic Regression Estimates of Participation in Spouse 
Selection by Two Education Groups 
 Level of Education Parent/Child Years of Education 
Measure 
> 8 years of 
education 
8+ years of 
education 
Child ≤ 
Parent Child > Parent 
 
Attitude- Children 
should participate in 
spouse choice 
 
   Child’s attitude 
 
0.97  1.43 ** 0.94 1.27 ** 
 (-
0.21)  (2.70) (-.040) (2.25) 
   Father’s attitude  1.22 + 1.24 1.15 1.24 * 
 (1.65)  (1.60) (0.81) (1.97) 
   Mother’s attitude  0.79 + 1.07 0.81 0.97 
 (-
1.78)  (0.56) (-1.32) 
(-
0.33) 
 Neighborhood average 
attitude (0.1 unit increase) 
 
1.08  0.96 0.93 0.98 
 
(1.34)  (-.29) (-1.07) 
(-
0.51) 
   
N  366  368 233 501 
df  24  24 24 24 
-2 log likelihood  926.4
8  1020.60 645.06 1352.13 
Z-values in parenthesis + p<0.10, *p-value<0.05, **p-value<0.01, ***p-value<0.001 (two-
tailed tests) 
  
All analyses control for respondent age at marriage, gender, caste, child and parental educational 
attainment in 1996, neighborhood distance to closest school, 1996 school enrollment, media 





Table 4.4. Discrete Time Hazard Model of the Influence of Individual, Parental and 
Neighborhood Characteristics on Timing of First Marriage 
Measure 
Arranged 




Attitude Children should 
participate in spouse choice 
 
   Child’s attitude 0.71 *** 0.93 1.30 * 
(-3.64) (-1.29) (2.39) 
   Father’s attitude 0.90 1.12 + 1.25 * 
(-1.14) (1.94) (2.00) 
   Mother’s attitude 1.10 0.98 0.88 
(1.00) (-0.40) (-1.06) 
 Neighborhood average attitude (0.1 
unit increase) 1.01 0.97 0.95 
(0.32) (-1.58) (-1.11) 
Person-months 64,947 
df 108 
-2 log likelihood 8934.08 
Z-values in parenthesis + p<0.10, *p-value<0.05, **p-value<0.01, ***p-value<0.001 
(two-tailed tests) 
All analyses control for respondent gender, caste, child and parental educational attainment in 
1996, neighborhood distance to closest school, 1996 school enrollment, media exposure, child 
and parent nonfamily work, travel, migration, number of siblings and month parameterization for 
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This dissertation has expanded on two areas of research within the study of ideational 
influences on family behavior. One area examines people’s understanding of the world 
and their beliefs in the causal relationships behind family and social change. The second 
area focuses on the intersection of the wills and desires of the individual and influential 
others in making important family formation decisions. This work also contributes to the 
larger body of literature on how individuals operate within a social context to influence 
others and act for themselves. 
Ideational frameworks help individuals describe, understand, and explain the 
world, by defining certain behaviors and institutions as meaningful. They also identify 
what is important and good in life, and what methods are appropriate and productive for 
achieving desired goals. Thus, understanding what people believe in, and the extent to 
which they believe it is requisite to comprehending individual behavior, which, in turn, 
aides in understanding social and demographic change. The primary focus of this 
dissertation is to supply additional knowledge on the role of people’s beliefs and values 
on behavior. 
W.I. Thomas’ Theorem, that a person’s belief, perception or definition of the 
event or issue has its own effect on the individual’s later actions, is a foundational 
statement of sociology (Thomas and Thomas 1928), and yet there are few large scale 




a result of the person’s definition of the situation, and whether or not the situation would 
have had an effect is possibly inconsequential because the definition of the situation itself 
has a real effect on actions. One exception to this pattern is a recent stream of theorizing 
linking people’s understanding of societal and family change (Thornton 2005). Chapters 
2 and 3 show that people have very strong views about what will make their family and 
society better, more educated, wealthier and more developed. This result has implications 
beyond work on family behavior because if the Thomas theorem is correct, then we 
would expect beliefs to have implications on people’s lives, regardless of if the beliefs 
are based on false assumptions of faulty logic. This then leads to further questions of 
where people learn these models, how often people rely on them, and how easily the 
models are changed or exchanged.  
In a first step to examine how people’s perceptions of the world differ, I use 
theory on variation in acceptance of rules and norms (Merton 1938) to show that two 
important elements appear: 1) people must have knowledge of the common model, and 2) 
people must have access to the means to work within that model and achieve the goals 
designated by the model. The lack of either one produces alternative models, or at least 
the rejection of the mainstream model. With both, there is conformity. Thus, people who 
are socially isolated or excluded tend to reject the common model linking societal and 
family change. Similarly, people with fewer nonfamily experiences, such as with 
education or mass media, are more likely to reject the modernization model. In addition 
to replicating this work in other social contexts, future work should examine the 




the causal connections between family and societal change may help explain the variation 
in the demographic behavior of these groups.  
Because individuals are nested in a social context of status, norms and, most 
importantly, other individuals, even a complete knowledge of an individual’s own beliefs 
is insufficient to fully understand an individual’s behavior. Since the beginning of 
sociology, scholars have theorized about how communities, families and individuals 
interact to influence individuals’ actions. A major question is the extent to which 
society’s norms, attitudes, beliefs, and values affect individual behavior. One possibility 
is that in the same way parents socialize their children by influencing their children’s 
beliefs, local communities can socialize its members to follow its norms and internalize 
its values, and that the social control mechanisms parents use in conjuncture with family 
socialization may parallel similar processes at a higher level of social organization 
(Cooley 1909; McKenzie 1921). Thus, this dissertation research reiterates the importance 
of scholars use of intergenerational models (Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007), but also 
extends the literature further by examining multiple intergenerational relationships (i.e. 
both father and mother) and the influence of neighbors. 
Until recently, inadequate data and incapable statistical methods have halted any 
joint examination of the multiple levels of ideational influence. This dissertation, 
particularly chapter 4, addresses these issues by relying on theoretical insights from 
social-psychologists, sociologists, historians, demographers and anthropologists, and by 
utilizing exemplary social data and advanced statistical methods. Important findings from 
this study are that there is empirical support of independent effects of multiple levels of 




individuals’ later behavior. That is, not only are family and community context 
important, but the relationship between the individual and other levels of society 
influences their effects on behavior. In this case, not only do the individual and parents’ 
attitudes toward spouse choice influence spouse choice behavior, but the level of the 
child’s education influences how well the child’s (and parents’) attitude predicts their 
later behavior. And although this essay only documents three levels of influence 
(individual, family and neighborhood) and one behavior (spouse choice), the number of 
possible parallel studies is infinite. Future work in this area should examine the specific 
mechanisms of socialization and social control parents and neighbors use to influence the 
children’s marital behavior. Also, learning more about how children and parents perceive 









Cooley, Charles Horton. 1909. Social Organization. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
McKenzie, Roderick D. 1921. "The neighborhood: A study of local life in the city of 
Columbus, Ohio, part 2." American Journal of Sociology 27:344-63. 
Merton, Robert K. 1938. "Social Structure and Anomie." American Sociological Review 
3:672-682. 
Thomas, W.I., and Dorothy S. Thomas. 1928. The Child in America: Behavior Problems 
and Programs. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Thornton, Arland. 2005. Reading History Sideways: The Fallacy and Enduring Impact of 
the Developmental Paradigm on Family Life. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Thornton, Arland, William G. Axinn, and Yu Xie. 2007. Marriage and Cohabitation: 









Appendix A: Measure Construction 
 
 The tables below contain the question wording, response options and distributions of the 36 measures used in the paper. Each 
question was asked in one of nine sections with 4-10 other questions. The introduction and first question wording are recorded under 
the appropriate section heading. “About the same” and “don’t know” were not given in the option categories and were only accepted 
after a probe. The question wording is followed by the code that was coded 1, the opposite answer (i.e. more vs. less common, richer 
vs. poorer, etc) as well “Same” and “don’t know” and “missing” were then coded as 0. The following columns provide the percent 
response distribution for each question. The order presented here is not necessarily the order of the sections or questions in the survey. 
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Questions         Coded as 1  Rich  Poor  About the Same  DK  Missing 




                     
                 
         
   
Rich  79.7  16.9  2.8  0.6  0.0 
Young people choosing their own spouse Rich  66.1  26.4  6.3  1.1  0.0 






      Coded as 1  Developed  Traditional  About the Same  DK  Missing 




               
                 
Developed  79.1  19.0  0.9  0.9  0.0 
Parents controlling who their children marry Traditional  30.9  67.2  1.1  0.7  0.0 












Questions         Coded as 1  Educated  Uneducated  About the Same  DK  Missing 
People marrying at older ages Educated  80.1  18.4  0.6  0.9  0.0 
Women getting treated with respect   
   
                 
             
                 
         
     
Educated  89.9  8.4  0.9  0.7  0.0 
Young people choosing their own spouse
 














Common  About the Same  DK  Missing 




                   
   
   
         
     
More Common  88.1  10.1  0.6  1.3  0.0 
Young people choosing their own spouse More Common  79.1  19.2  0.6  1.1  0.0 










Common  About the Same  DK  Missing 




                   
More Common  87.7  11.2  0.2  0.9  0.0 
Young people choosing their own spouse More Common  83.1  16.2  0.2  0.6  0.0 







                   





Questions         Coded as 1  More Common 
Less 
Common  About the Same  DK  Missing 




               
             
         
   
More Common  89.6  9.1  0.2  1.1  0.0 












Questions         Coded as 1  Richer  Poorer  About the Same  DK  Missing 




             
                 
         
   
Richer  87.7  10.4  0.7  1.1  0.0 










Questions         Coded as 1  Better  Worse  About the Same  DK  Missing 




                     
                     
Better  88.5  9.9  0.7  0.9  0.0 
If more young people chose their own 
spouse  Better  71.9  23.6  3.4  1.1  0.0 






                 





Questions         Coded as 1  More Educated  Less Educated  About the Same  DK  Missing 
If more people married at older ages More Educated  88.3  10.2  0.6  0.9  0.0 
If women were treated with more respect   
   
More Educated  89.0  9.3  0.6  1.1  0.0 
If more young people chose their own 
spouse    More Educated  72.8  23.1  2.8  1.3  0.0 
If more married couples used contraception More Educated  83.8  14.5  0.9  0.7  0.0 
 
